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Abstract 
  
Since the 1970’s, antidiscrimination advocates have approached Title VII as 
though the impact of the law on minorities and women could be considered in isolation.   
This article argues that this is a mistake.  Instead, Gender and the Tournament attempts 
to reclaim Title VII’s original approach, which justified efforts to dismantle segregated 
workplaces as necessary to both eliminate discrimination and promote economic 
growth.  Using that approach, this Article is the first to consider how widespread 
corporate tournaments and growing gender disparities in the upper echelons of the 
economy are intrinsically intertwined, and how they undermine the core promises of 
antidiscrimination law.  The Article draws on a pending case challenging the “rank and 
yank” evaluation system at Microsoft, as well as social science literature regarding 
narcissism and stereotype expectations, to illustrate how consideration of the legitimacy 
of competitive pay for performance schemes is essential to combating the intrinsically 
gendered nature of advancement in the new economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Ellen Pao galvanized attention to the plight of women in the financial world 
by suing Kleiner Perkins, Silicon Valley’s storied venture capital firm, for sex 
discrimination.  Only six percent of venture capital partners are women,1  and 
Perkins enticed Pao to the firm with promises of advancement.   Yet, after seven 
years in her job, she found the promises hollow.  She alleged that men were 
promoted ahead of women, that the firm embraced men’s business promotion more 
readily than women’s, and that it provided little support for women who experienced 
sexual harassment, a not uncommon occurrence in the financial world.   Pao charged 
that Kleiner Perkins was a “boys’ club,” with gender-coded evaluations and different 
                                                 
1 Davey Alba, Ellen Pao Ends Her Lawsuit Against Kleiner Perkins, WIRED BUS. (Sept. 10, 
2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/09/ellen-pao-ends-lawsuit-kleiner-perkins/.  And that 
number represents a drop from 10% in 1999 to 6% in 2015. Vivian Giang, Why the Few 
Women Venture Capitalists Often Give up, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 4, 2015), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3041862/strong-female-lead/why-the-few-women-venture-
capitalists-often-give-up.  
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standards of advancement for men and women.2  While the firm claimed to prize 
initiative and drive, Pao’s performance reviews dinged her for “sharp elbows,”3 a 
trait rarely criticized among the men. Following a five-week trial in 2015, the trial 
court dismissed her case.    
In September 2014, Katherine Moussouris and two other women filed a 
class action lawsuit against Microsoft.4  They claimed that Microsoft’s “stack 
ranking” system,” which graded technical and engineering employees on a forced 
curve, discriminated against women.  The system identifies a top group in line to 
receive bigger bonuses and promotion opportunities, a middle group of adequate 
employees, and a bottom group whom the company encouraged to leave. The 
ranking system created internal competition that supposedly aligned employee 
objectives with the company mission, but it has also been the subject of a withering 
management analysis that finds it destructive.  Although Microsoft abandoned the 
system after Moussouris filed the class action, a large number of Fortune 500 
companies use similar systems.5  And the action against Microsoft is continuing.6  
 
* * * 
 
Two literatures increasingly take aim at the worlds of Ellen Pao and 
Katherine Moussouris – and the workplaces that have most contributed to increasing 
gender inequality. The first challenges practices in the new economy, such as the 
corporate “tournament”7 that valorizes intense competition either as an end in itself 
                                                 
2 Ruth Reader, Ellen Pao’s Lawyer Concludes: Kleiner Perkins Is a Boys’ Club, VENTURE 
BEAT (Mar. 24, 2015), http://venturebeat.com/2015/03/24/ellen-paos-lawyer-concludes-
kleiner-perkins-is-a-boys-club/. 
3 Patrick Kulp, 5 Things We Learned About Silicon Valley Culture from the Ellen Pao Trial, 
MASHABLe (Mar. 29, 2015), http://mashable.com/2015/03/29/ellen-pao-trial-
recap/#obaH6S8iSkq5. 
4 Complaint, Sept 16, 2015 Docket No. 2:15-cv-01483 (W.D. Wash. Sept 16, 2015). 
5 Jeanne Sahadi, Amazon Workplace Story Raises Dread of ‘Rank and Yank’ Reviews, 
MONEY (Aug. 17, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/17/news/amazon-performance-
review/.  
6 Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. C15-1483JLR, Order at 4 (W.D. Wash., Oct. 14, 
2016). On May 2, 2017, the court appointed a Special Master to make discovery 
recommendations. Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. C15-1483JLR, Order 
Appointing Special Master (W.D. Wash.), 
http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20FDCO%2020170503G54/MOUSSOURIS%20v.%2
0MICROSOFT%20CORPORATION.  
7 Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2002): 
These executives are hyper-motivated survivors of a highly competitive 
tournament . . . who have proven their ability to make money while putting 
on a veneer of loyalty to the firm. At least some of the new breed appear 
to be Machiavellian, narcissistic, prevaricating, pathologically optimistic, 
free from self-doubt and moral distractions, willing to take great risk as the 
company moves up and to lie when things turn bad, and nurtured by a 
 
 
 
4 
 
or as an aid to the pursuit of reductionist short-term objectives.  While many continue 
to defend the system8 as necessary to create more dynamic corporate environments 
in a rapidly changing world of technological change and globalization, an increasing 
number of scholars maintain that the new system has not outperformed the earlier 
managerial model9 and has arguably contributed, both to a decline in productivity 
growth and to greater societal inequality.10  More critically, a growing chorus of 
management experts specifically identifies the emphasis on “sharp elbows” that such 
systems produce as counterproductive.  Even some of the original champions of 
these corporate “reforms” describe the hypercompetitive practices that have resulted 
as negative sum competitions that destroy teamwork, undermine ethical practices,11 
and reduce long-term institutional health.12  Indeed, Forbes Magazine referred to 
Microsoft’s rank-and-yank system as “The Management Approach Guaranteed to 
Wreck Your Best People.”13 
A second literature looks at the failure of antidiscrimination law to address 
the increasing gender gaps in the new economy.14 To be sure, overall gender 
                                                 
corporate culture that instills loyalty to insiders, obsession with short-term 
stock price, and intense distrust of outsiders. 
8 See, e.g., Commentary: Jack Welch, ‘Rank-and-Yank?’ That’s Not How It’s Done, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 14, 2013, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303789604579198281053673534. 
9 Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of 
Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1171 (2013). 
10 See, e.g., RETHINKING CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS AND POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE AND 
INCLUSIVE GROWTH 7 (Michael Jacobs & Mariana Mazzucato eds. 2016) (linking “secular 
stagnation” or low productivity growth to short-termism and a decline in investment)   
11 Perhaps the most notable scholar to recant is Michael C. Jensen, who helped usher in 
modern executive compensation systems. See Michael C. Jensen, Paying People to Lie: The 
Truth about the Budgeting Process, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 379 (2003) (observing that using 
budgets or targets in an organization’s performance measurement and compensation systems 
has encourages gaming the system); see also Lynn Stout, Killing Conscience: The 
Unintended Behavioral Consequences of 'Pay for Performance', 39 J. CORP. L. 529, 533 
(2014) (describing the counterproductive effectives of modern executive compensation).  
12 The impact on institutional health is a product of three overlapping forces.  First is the 
emphasis on shareholder primacy and the short-termism associated with it. See supra notes 
9 and 10.   Second is pay for performance and the perverse incentives it creates.  See supra 
notes 11 and 12. Third is financialization, both because of the promotion of short-termism in 
publicly traded companies and because of the incentives in financial firms to promote opaque 
products as the expense of customers and long term institutional health.  See, e.g., CLAIRE 
A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS: PROMOTING GOOD 
BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 102-03 (2015)(describing the practices 
that led to the financial crisis). 
13 Erika Anderson, The Management Approach Guaranteed to Wreck Your Best People, 
FORBES (July 2012). 
14 See, e.g., Arianne Renan Barzilay & Anat Ben-David, Platform Inequality: Gender in the 
Gig Economy, 47 SETON HALL L. REV.  393 (2017); Deborah 
Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L. REV. 17, 26 
(2010); U.S.  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Diversity in High Tech,  
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disparities, including the wage gap between men and women’s earnings, have 
narrowed.15  Yet, the trends have moved in the opposite direction at the top.  
Controlling for a broader range of factors, such as education and hours worked, the 
extent to which men have outpaced women has been particularly dramatic for those 
with earnings above the 90% income percentile.16  Today, the greatest gender 
disparities occur in the portions of the economy that have shown the greatest growth 
in compensation, including the upper management ranks, such as those at Microsoft, 
and the financial sector, which includes the venture capital world of Kleiner Perkins.  
Overwhelmingly, this second literature concludes that these gender disparities arise 
from “structural forces” that Title VII has had difficulty addressing.17  
Legal scholars, courts, and legislatures have developed these two literatures 
as separate discourses.18  This Article is the first to consider how the negative sum 
competition and growing gender disparities in the upper echelons of the economy 
are intrinsically intertwined, and how they then undermine the core promises of 
antidiscrimination law.  As it shows, so long as the discourses remain separate, 
counterproductive business practices that contribute to societal inequality and 
entrench group-based disparities escape censure because these practices simply look 
like routine, legally justifiable business decisions. The Article argues for a 
substantive engagement with the legitimacy of the business practices that 
systematically produce gender disparities.19  It concludes that this is the first step in 
                                                 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/reports/hightech/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2017); Julia 
Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm? The Postindustrial Corporation and Advanced 
Information Technology, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2016). 
15 Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 24.   
16 Elise Gould, Jessica Schieder, & Kathleen Geier, What Is the Gender Pay Gap and Is It 
Real?, Figs. B, D (2016), http://www.epi.org/publication/what-is-the-gender-pay-gap-and-
is-it-real/. 
17 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 458 (2001) (defining these forms of bias); cf. Samuel 
R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2006) (observing that “structural employment inequalities cannot be solved 
without going beyond the generally accepted normative underpinnings of antidiscrimination 
law”); see generally Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 93 (2015) 
(describing the structural approach).  
18 A limited exception is the literature that developed following the financial crisis 
commenting on the relative dearth of women in the decision-making centers most 
responsible for the crisis.  See, e.g., SCANDALOUS ECONOMICS: GENDER AND THE POLITICS 
OF FINANCIAL CRISES ch. 2, 3 (Aida A. Hozić & Jacqui True, eds. 2016). This literature, 
however, does not address anti-discrimination law or the potential legal remedies. 
19 This article focuses only on the relationship between negative sum workplace competitions 
and gender disparities, because the distinctive interaction between gender and negative sum 
workplace competitions.  Similar practices may influence disparities based on race, age, or 
other legally actionable categories. See, e.g., Karraker v. Rent-a-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831 
(7th Cir. 2005), on remand, 2005 WL 2001511 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2005), on remand, 2005 
WL 297652 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2005) (prohibiting use of a personality inventory as a basis for 
promotion because of its impact on those with disabilities). 
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moving towards “equality law,” which returns to the origins of antidiscrimination 
law and recasts it as part of a broader effort to address the structural forces that 
simultaneously entrench group-based disparities and restrain economic growth.  
Equality law involves the identification of substantive employment practices 
inconsistent with a commitment to economic equality, and delegitimization of these 
practices as inappropriate when applied to any employee.20 
Part I excavates the history of Title VII, showing that the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 was enacted to dismantle the racially and sex-segregated workplaces of 
midcentury America through the combination of antidiscrimination law, economic 
stimulus and education and training.  As this history shows, Title VII, to be effective 
in combating discrimination, has to be interpreted in light of the economic realities 
of the employment systems in which it is operating. 
Part II examines the new structural forces that simultaneously increase 
income inequality in the economy21  and gender disparities in the economic sectors 
that have produced the greatest income growth.  The new economy, which has arisen 
with the information revolution and globalization, has replaced the lock-step career 
ladders and relatively egalitarian tiers of the industrial era with workplaces that 
valorize individualism and competition,22 generating much more steeply banked 
income hierarchies23 that threaten to undermine teamwork, productivity, and 
investment in the future. It also creates a triple bind for women, who become less 
likely to seek out such workplaces, less likely to be seen as having the qualities 
necessary to succeed within them, and more likely to penalized when they display 
the same self-interested qualities as the men, further discouraging future 
applications.24 This section establishes the links between the new management 
system and the exacerbation of gender disparities, requiring a reorientation in the 
focus of antidiscrimination law.  
                                                 
20 The term “equality law” is used here to describe approaches that arise from combining 
traditional antidiscrimination analysis with consideration of the substantive justifications that 
determine the legitimacy of inequality enhancing practices.  This article, however, does not 
take a position on whether “equality” in some abstract sense should always be favored at the 
expense of other objectives.  Nor does it suggest that the fact that a practice increases 
inequality is grounds to consider it illegitimate per se.  Instead, it maintains only that where 
practices contribute to overall economic inequality or to race, gender, and other disparities, 
their substantive justifications on business terms should be interrogated rather than assumed.  
21 See, e.g., Timothy Noah, Income Inequality: Panel on Financialization, Economic 
Opportunity, and the Future of American Democracy, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 57, 57-58 
(2013). 
22  Am. Ass’n Univ. Women, The Simple Truth About the Gender Pay Gap (2013), 
http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/03/the-simple-truth-about-the-gender-pay-gap-2013.pdf. 
23 June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031 (2017). 
24 Of course, not all women act in the same way, and many of the stereotypes about women 
are just that – stereotypes.  See, e.g., CORDELIA FINE, TESTOSTERONE REX:  MYTHS OF SEX, 
SCIENCE, AND SOCIETY (2017); Coren Apicella & Johanna Mollderstrom, Women Do Like 
to Compete – Against Themselves,  N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/opinion/sunday/women-do-like-to-compete-against-
themselves.html.  
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Part III shows how these structural changes explain the failure of 
antidiscrimination law to deal with individual cases similar to the one Ellen Pao 
brought against Kleiner Perkins while opening the door to more effective claims 
such as Katherine Moussouris’s class action suit against Microsoft.  Pao’s suit took 
the Kleiner Perkins evaluation system as a given, requiring an intrinsically 
subjective evaluation of whether her contributions to the company outweighed her 
“sharp elbows” in the same way they did for the men.   In contrast, the Moussouris 
case makes the validity of the underlying business practices the central legal issue.  
The case focuses attention not just on Microsoft’s failure to create an environment 
in which women can thrive, but also on the systemic links between negative sum 
competitions and gender disparities. This section thus argues that antidiscrimination 
efforts, to be more effective, need to interrogate the background business practices 
that are embedded in corporate cultures.  
The conclusion explores how equality law might be remade.  The original 
passage of antidiscrimination law took aim at the structural factors that produced 
segregated workplaces and sought not just to outlaw discrimination but to address 
the economic forces that perpetuated market segmentation.  In contrast, modern 
antidiscrimination discourse has tended to separate consideration of the structural 
factors producing the tournament mentality from the greater inequality the 
tournament creates, treating the resulting gender disparities as either presumptively 
valid or outside of the scope of Title VII altogether.25  The recreation of an equality 
law approach would identify the structural forces that produce inequality and 
consider the legitimacy of the practices.  Where the practices cannot be justified, 
equality law would root them out through the combination of antidiscrimination law 
and structural reforms.26  This article is thus a first step toward reuniting equality 
promotion with antidiscrimination approaches. 
I. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY 
 
 Congress enacted Title VII and other laws at the height of the Civil Rights 
movement of mid-twentieth century America.27  Yet, while these laws clearly 
condemned discrimination in employment, they did not just seek to promote racial 
                                                 
25 See Sturm, supra note 17. 
26 For an example of possible structural forms unrelated to gender disparities, see Lynne L. 
Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 541 (2016).   
27 This was a period in which income equality had fallen markedly, led primarily by gains 
for working class white men and more restrained executive and professional incomes. See 
Claudia Goldin & Robert A. Margo, The Great Compression: The U.S. Wage Structure at 
Mid-Century, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1 (Feb. 1992). The Gini coefficient—the most widely accepted 
statistical measure of income inequality in a country—shows a four decades’ rise in America 
since the late 1960s to today. The Major Trends in U.S. Income Inequality Since 1947, 
POLITICAL CALCULATIONS (Dec. 4, 2013), 
http://politicalcalculations.blogspot.com/2013/12/the-major-trends-in-us-income.html#. 
V3xWYk32aUl. 
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and gender equality in isolation.  Instead, their proponents sought to address what 
they saw as a broad-based structural issue: the segmentation of the economy that 
marginalized women and minority workers and obstructed economic growth.28  
White men during this period already enjoyed a remarkable degree of economic 
equality, security and wage growth,29 so the goal was to make these opportunities 
available to other groups.  President Kennedy, who initially proposed what became 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other antidiscrimination measures,30  did so as part 
of a multi-faceted approach that linked antidiscrimination efforts to economic 
equality and national prosperity.   
Modern Title VII scholars argue that today’s limits on the advancement of 
women and minorities have become “structural” in nature,  following from the 
change in promotion practices  from lockstep advancement to performance pay and 
lateral moves that rest on  “patterns of interaction, informal norms, networking, 
mentoring, and evaluation.”31  Yet, Title VII’s origins indicate that it addressed a 
much more explicit form of structural inequality – the segmentation of the labor 
market into white male jobs, with security, benefits, and lock-step patterns of 
advancement, and other less attractive jobs for black men, white women and black 
women – and sought to delegitimize this segmentation. 
 This Section reviews the development of antidiscrimination employment 
laws.  It first explores the legislative history that demonstrates the structural nature 
of the antidiscrimination efforts, their focus on opening the portals to jobs that 
provided security and advancement, and the nature of the links between those laws 
and the parallel efforts to promote economic growth.  Second, it examines the early 
cases interpreting Title VII, and their relationship to the structural purpose of the 
legislation.  Third, the section assesses the success of the antidiscrimination efforts, 
demonstrating that their principal successes came from the structural reforms they 
produced. 
 
A. Title VII’s Structural Approach  
 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal 
Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 305, 322 (2013) (noting the role of “labor-management concordat” following 
World War II in which “labor unions received income and benefits sufficient to carry their 
members into the middle class”).  For data showing steady increase in household income 
between 1950 and 1965, see United States Median Household Income: 1950-1990, 
http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci120a/immigration/Median%20Household%20Income.p
df (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).    
29 See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA, 1960-2010 
(2013) (documenting the stability of white men’ jobs).   
30See John F. Kennedy, Report to the American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), 
https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/LH8F_0Mzv0e6Ro1yEm74Ng.aspx. 
31 Sturm, supra note 17, at 458. 
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Advocates of Title VII, which focuses on discrimination in employment, 
recognized that the restricted access to “good jobs” 32  helped to keep wages for these 
positions high by restricting the pool of potential employees.33  This further had the 
effect of discouraging investment in the human capital of those excluded, and meant 
that general efforts to boost employment through macroeconomic policies did not 
necessarily reach the entire country.   As a result, discrimination hurt not just those 
treated unfavorably by the discrimination but the economy as a whole. 
 In 1963, President Kennedy proposed antidiscrimination legislation that 
framed the effort to prohibit employment discrimination in terms of the promotion 
of greater economic growth.  He had entered office during a recession, persuaded 
Congress to adopt tax cuts and other stimulus measures, and yet had been frustrated 
by the fact that while corporate profits soared, unemployment remained stubbornly 
high. 34  Indeed, the legislative history of Title VII identified the expansion of the 
labor market to include full utilization of the country’s human resources as a matter 
of national interest, and full employment as a national policy, separate and apart 
from antidiscrimination as an important objective.35     
Kennedy saw the solution as a three part effort to reduce inequality.  First, 
he introduced Title VII, which sought to dismantle racially segregated workplaces 
that Kennedy maintained obstructed economic growth.36  Second, he proposed 
continuation of the economic stimulus that had already boosted business profits, 
implicitly recognizing that without jobs for everyone, antidiscrimination efforts 
might simply lower the benefits associated with white male workplaces.37  Third, he 
advocated education and training efforts for African-American so that disparities in 
the qualifications of potential employees could not be used to justify segregated 
workplaces. 38   All three efforts focused on opening what had been “narrow portals” 
into entry-level employment opportunities.39  This structural focus on the American 
economy framed the legislation.   
                                                 
32 See ARNE L. KALLEBERG, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS: THE RISE OF POLARIZED AND 
PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970S-2000S at 5-6 
(2011)(defining good jobs as those that pay well, offer benefits and provide security). 
33 See Ruth G. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 12 MICH. J. L. REFORM 397, 401-15 (1979) (describing impact of 
segmented workforce on wages). 
34 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 2730, 2732 (1964), file:///C:/Users/ncahn/Downloads/CR-1964-
0210-PL88-352-H.pdf. (“the economic health of the Nation would be improved through 
fuller and fairer utilization of available and potential manpower”).  
35 Id. 
36 See Kennedy, supra note 30. 
37 See, e.g., Paul Burstein & Mark Evan Edwards, The Impact of Employment Discrimination 
Litigation on Racial Disparity in Earnings: Evidence and Unresolved Issues, 28 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 79 (1994). 
38 Kennedy’s original proposal did not address sex discrimination. See infra discussion in 
text at notes 41-49. 
39 Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account 
of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 99-100 (2003), citing 
Katherine V. W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing 
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Although Title VII did not originally address sex discrimination, its 
inclusion—on the floor of the House of Representatives40—served as a recognition 
that women faced many of the same forms of explicitly discriminatory practices as 
racial minorities.  The want ads of the day, after all, listed job openings under “male” 
and “female” categories, signaling the gendered nature of the employment.41   
Moreover, career advancement depended to a much greater degree than today on 
winning access to the entry-level positions in a relatively smaller number of large 
corporations.42  Howard Smith of Virginia, who proposed the addition of sex 
discrimination to the bill, appeared to be motivated by the structural nature of the 
legislation.43  He supported women’s rights (as well as the racism common in the 
Virginia of his day), and observed that he “did not want ‘his’ women to take second 
place to men and women of other races.”44  He thus understood that a principal effect 
of antidiscrimination law would be to increase access to a larger number of good 
                                                 
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 535 (2001)(describing 
the jobs of the era as “characterized by job ladders, limited ports of entry, and implicit 
contracts for long-term job security.”).   
40 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577–
2584 (1964)).  
41 Ads From The State Seeking “Male Help” and “Female Help,” (June 1958), TEACHING 
AMERICAN HISTORY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 
http://www.teachingushistory.org/ttrove/wantads.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).  For a 
broader discussion of the nature of sex segregation before and after passage of the 
antidiscrimination acts, see. Blumrosen, supra note 33, at 402-15 (concluding that even after 
passage of Title VII, sex-segregated jobs account for as much or more of the gendered wage 
gap than unequal treatment within the same jobs). 
42 Blumrosen, supra note 33, at 412 (observing that white and minority men both enjoyed 
upward wage trajectories over time (with smaller gains for minority men) while women’s 
income curves tended to remain flat). 
43 Although the conventional story is that the addition of “sex” was an afterthought, designed 
to sink the legislation, this appears to be a myth.  Some commentators maintain that the 
amendment to add “sex” by racist Representative Howard Smith of Virginia was intended to 
mock the bill and thwart its passage. Clay Risen, The Accidental Feminist, SLATE (Feb. 7, 
2014, 12:54 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/02/the_50th_ 
anniversary_of_title_vii_of_the_civil_rights_act_and_the_southern.html. But see Mary 
Anne Case, Legal Protections for the "Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title VII’s 
Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the 
Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1339 (2014) (arguing that Smith in fact supported 
women’s rights).  In the House of Representatives, the bill passed by a somewhat anemic 
vote of 168 to 133. Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. 
REV. 431, 442 (1966); see also Arianne Renan Barzilay, Parenting Title VII: Rethinking the 
History of the Sex Discrimination Prohibition, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 55, 94 (2016); 
Robert C. Bird, More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of 
Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137 (1997); 
Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)history, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 
718-21 (2015).  
44 Case, supra note 43, at 1339.   
 
 
 
11 
 
jobs, tempting employers in need of low wage workers to look to women to fill the 
gaps – unless the law prohibited both race and sex discrimination.45 
 Similarly, African-American women saw racial and gender equality as 
linked for similar reasons.46  Discrimination on the basis of race and sex relegated 
them out of more desirable jobs altogether.47  Pauli Murray argued that segregated 
workplaces allowed employers to pit workers against each other.48  
Antidiscrimination law, by breaking down the barriers that segmented these 
workplaces by race and gender while continuing economic stimulus that kept the 
pressure on wage growth, promised to lift the floor, allowing all workers to enjoy 
the same benefits as white males and eliminating the existence of marginalized 
groups who could be hired for less and set in opposition to each other.49 
 
B. The Judicial Construction of Title VII and the Antidiscrimination Principle 
 
 By the early seventies, the integration of antidiscrimination law with efforts 
to promote more general economic equality largely came to an end.  Stagflation, 
rather than recession, dogged the economy, and the Nixon Administration distanced 
itself from the “war on poverty’s” more ambitious equality enhancing measures.50  
The antidiscrimination principle remained important, however, and the courts 
refined the Title VII approach through judicial decisions that continued the efforts 
to dismantle segregated workplaces.   
These decisions reflected Title VII’s structural origins as an effort to 
delegitimize all-white and all-male workplaces.  Like the legislative debate, 
                                                 
45 Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, who supported the amendment, also claimed that 
without it, “white women would be last at the hiring gate.” 110 CONG. REC. 2577, 2578-2580 
(1964) (statement of Rep. Griffith). 
46 While tensions existed from the beginning between advocates of racial and gender 
equality, African-American women embraced the new law.  Even before the 
antidiscrimination law passed, black women were more likely to be in the workplace, more 
likely to be single mothers, and less likely to enjoy protection from either the protections 
available to blue-collar men or to more privileged women.  They thus saw antidiscrimination 
laws as providing a vehicle to fight the marginalization of the positions open to them.  See, 
e.g., Cary Franklin, Inventing the "Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1307, 1327 (2012); Serena Mayeri, "A Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-
Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1058 (2001). 
47 Mayeri, Intersectionality, supra note 46, at 717-21. 
48 Id. at 721. 
49 Id. at 723-24; see also Ruth Gerber Blumrosen, Remedies for Wage Discrimination, 20 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 99, 102 (1986) (observing that “ordinary Title VII analysis, proof that 
the employer segregated women and minorities in low-paying positions would be sufficient 
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination”). 
50 Brian C. Kalt, Wade H. McCree, Jr., and the Office of the Solicitor General, 1977-1981, 
1998 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 709 (noting that “[t]he relative economic 
prosperity of the Sixties, which had allowed for the bold liberal social experiments of the 
Great Society, had given way to the “stagflation” of the Seventies, which was less conducive 
to progressive policy.” 
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however, these decisions expressed ambivalence about efforts to use 
antidiscrimination law to address pregnancy and childcare responsibilities – or any 
number of other practices that had differential effects on various groups.51  The 
subsequent judicial history has thus been most consistent in applying 
antidiscrimination law where the courts conclude both that the employer’s action 
obstructs an agreed upon objective (e.g., dismantling segregated workplaces) and 
where the differential effect on a protected class is part of a pattern of discriminatory 
conduct.  They have been most contentious, in contrast, where   there is no agreed 
upon objective (e.g., accounting for parental responsibilities), even where the 
differential effect on a protected class is part of a pattern of conduct that 
disproportionately affects women.  
The early cases addressing sex discrimination illustrate the tensions.  Given 
the relatively late addition of the category “sex” to the statute, there was little 
legislative history to guide the courts and, in particular, no expression of 
Congressional intent with respect to women’s family obligations.52  The courts, 
however, interpreted sex discrimination in much the same way as they interpreted 
racial discrimination, that is, as barring explicit barriers to hiring.  Thus, the first 
U.S. Supreme Court case to interpret Title VII ruled that the law prohibited a sex-
based classification that prohibited hiring mothers (though not fathers) with pre-
school age children,53 and a subsequent case upheld a prohibition on male and 
female want ads against a First Amendment challenge.54  At the same time, however, 
the Court rejected efforts to consider different treatment based on pregnancy as a 
form of discrimination, leaving the issue to Congress.55   The Supreme Court of that 
era saw pregnancy as a matter of individual choice;56 it did not treat pregnancy as a 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (ruling that Title VII does not include 
pregnancy discrimination).  Not until 2007 did the EEOC explain how to approach “family 
responsibilities discrimination.” EEOC Guidance on Family Responsibilities (2007), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html#background 
52 From the beginning, advocates of this era drew analogies between racial discrimination 
and sex discrimination with respect to workplace segregation.   See, in particular, Pauli 
Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 239 (1965) (arguing that sex discrimination, like racial 
discrimination, treated women as inferior and creating a caste-like status that justified 
occupational segregation and discrimination).   
53 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544–45 (1971) (describing the policy as 
an explicit gender-based classification). 
54 See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding 
prohibitions of sex-segregated help-wanted advertisements in the face of a First Amendment 
challenge). 
55 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded 
by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. 
56 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136; Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 489-92 (observing that pregnancy is a 
choice, unlike illnesses that constitute similar temporary physical disabilities). 
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structural obstacle to women’s workplace access of a kind with the types of barriers 
Congress intended Title VII to address.57    
The same dichotomy runs through the courts’ allocation of the burden of 
proof.  Once employers moved away from explicitly race or sex-based 
classifications, the courts struggled with the question of the proof necessary to 
establish discriminatory intent.    They became more likely to infer wrongful intent 
where the practice itself could be discredited, and more reluctant to do so where the 
business practice was treated as presumptively legitimate.58 
In individual cases alleging disparate treatment, the Supreme Court 
established a burden-shifting framework that required a “comparator.”59  In these 
cases, courts allowed plaintiffs to prove discrimination where they otherwise lacked 
sufficient direct evidence of bias by establishing unequal treatment between two 
employees, creating an inference of discrimination if the employer treated the 
member of the protected class, such as a woman, less favorably than the employer 
treated a comparably situated male employee.60  The Court emphasized that while a 
prospective employee must show that she met the qualifications for the job, Title 
VII required “the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment” that discriminated on the basis of race or other impermissible 
classifications.61 
 The comparator test tied proof of discriminatory motive to assumptions 
about segregated workplaces.  The foundational case, McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, involved a large industrial workplace, with many employees performing 
relatively similar duties.62  The Court assumed that where such an employer 
announced an opening, rejected a qualified African-American applicant, kept the 
position open, and then hired a similarly qualified white applicant, discriminatory 
motive was a reasonable inference.  The Court allowed the employer to rebut the 
inference through the articulation of a legitimate good faith reason for the rejection 
of the African-American applicant.  Typically, in these cases, an employer who 
could show a practice of interracial hiring had an easier time rebutting the inference 
                                                 
57At the time Title VII was passed, only 30% of married mothers with children under the age 
of 18 were in the labor force.  Sharon R. Cohany & Emy Sok, Trends in Labor Participation 
by Married Mothers of Infants, MONTHLY LABOR REV. (Feb. 2007), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2007/02/art2full.pdf.   The big increases in women’s labor 
force participation would become between 1980 and 2000.  Id. at Chart 1. Since then, there 
has been much greater commitment to women’s workplace inclusion, and recognition that 
full inclusion of women in the workplace requires treating pregnancy and family 
responsibilities as matter of workplace structure.  See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING 
GENDER (2000).   
58 See infra text at notes 59-93. 
59 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). 
60 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 745-46 (2011). 
61 Id. at 801.   
62 See id. at 755 (observing that “[t]his system had the potential to work well in the large 
industrial workplaces of the manufacturing age Tayloresque workplaces, where multiple 
workers engage in tasks that are susceptible to relatively straightforward comparison”). 
 
 
 
14 
 
than one who maintained an all-white workforce.63  The ordering of the burden of 
proof thus reinforced the presumptive illegitimacy of all-white workplaces and the 
rejection of otherwise qualified African-American applicants, tying both to an 
inference of discriminatory motive.   
 Suzanne Goldberg and other scholars have argued that this comparator 
requirement does not work terribly well in modern workplaces, which are much less 
likely to employ only white males or to have standardized assignments of 
responsibility.64  In the context of employer actions that may be intrinsically 
individualized and subjective, the courts have adopted strict requirements for 
comparators who can establish the requisite employer intent without more direct 
proof of discriminatory motive.65 While the need for comparators in these terms 
limits the ability of antidiscrimination law to reach cases of disparate treatment, the 
real problem is the absence of a substantive equality ideal supported by government 
mandates66 – or identification of specific practices with wrongful conduct.  Since 
employers no longer create entirely white or entirely male workforces, however, the 
wrongful conduct is no longer connected to practices such as examinations that were 
historically used to exclude protected groups; instead, the determination of when a 
business practice is “illegitimate” because it disproportionately affects protected 
groups requires reconsideration.  
A comparable dichotomy underlies disparate impact law, the second means 
the Supreme Court developed for addressing the more subtle forms of 
discrimination.  Disparate impact analysis differs from disparate treatment cases in 
that given sufficient proof that an employment practice has a disparate impact on a 
suspected class, no proof of discriminatory intent is necessary.67  
The Supreme Court initially set out the elements of disparate impact 
doctrine in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.68  Before Title VII, the Duke Power Company, 
headquartered in Charlotte, N.C., “had intentionally segregated its workforce, 
                                                 
63 See, e.g., Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 1997) (observing that the 
fact that eighty-eight percent of the work force was comprised of minorities undercut 
plaintiff’s claim of discriminatory motive). 
64 Goldberg, supra note 60, at 756 (describing “the flexible and dynamic nature of many 
contemporary jobs”). 
65 See, e.g., Haywood v. Locke, 387 F. App’x 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2010) (“plaintiffs are 
required to show that they are similar in all relevant respects to their comparator. . . . Such a 
showing would include evidence that the employees ‘dealt with the same supervisor, [were] 
subject to the same standards and . . . engaged in the same conduct without such 
differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the 
employer's treatment of them for it.’”). 
66 For example, the courts have always been reluctant to read antidiscrimination provisions 
as mandating pregnancy accommodations, however important such accommodations might 
be to women’s workforce participation; such accommodation has been viewed as special 
treatment rather than equal treatment. See Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination 
Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1096, 1101 (2015). 
67 Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 705–
06 (2006). 
68 401 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971). 
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restricting its African American employees to generally undesirable jobs.”69  During 
the fifties, the company imposed a high school degree requirement for assignment 
to the company’s better-paid positions, and after Title VII became effective, it 
required those seeking employment or transfers to pass two written examinations.70  
Only one of the African-Americans in a position to seek reassignment was a high 
school graduate and whites generally outperformed African-Americans on the tests 
by three to one.71  A unanimous Supreme Court found the tests to be discriminatory, 
and the case set the paradigm for a successful disparate impact suit.72  Disparate 
impact analysis has been criticized as encouraging employers to create quotas; only 
with an integrated workforce can employers insulate themselves from the threat of 
litigation.  Yet, in the context of workplaces like Duke Power Company with a long 
history of discrimination that is exactly what antidiscrimination law sought to 
accomplish.73 
Feminists and other antidiscrimination scholars have argued for an 
expansion of disparate impact theory to reach a variety of employment practices that 
have a differential impact on protected groups.74  This has been difficult, as Mike 
Selmi explains, because the Supreme Court adopted the disparate impact approach 
“to deal with specific practices, seniority systems and written tests, that were 
perpetuating past intentional discrimination” and that “the reality has been that the 
theory has proved an ill fit for any challenge other than to written examinations.” 75  
In contrast with the written examination cases, courts routinely reject disparate 
impact challenges to “part-time work, light duty requests, and disability policies 
based on a failure to accommodate pregnancy.”76  Indeed, courts do not interpret 
Title VII or the Family and Medical Leave Act “to require disturbing core business 
practices as a means of eradicating the disadvantage women suffer as a result of their 
childbearing and childrearing responsibilities.”77   
Efforts to extend disparate impact doctrine did not succeed for the same 
reasons that efforts to extend disparate treatment cases to pregnancy failed.  The 
                                                 
69 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1227-29 (4th Cir. 1970) (“Until 1966, no 
Negro had ever held a position at [the plant] in any department other than the Labor 
Department”).   
70  401 U.S. at 427-28 
71 Selmi, supra note 67, at 718. 
72 Id. at 723-24. 
73 See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 67, at 714. This purpose continues to animate disparate impact 
cases.  In Ward’s Cove Packing v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653, (1989), the Supreme Court 
attempted to water down the business necessity standard, complaining that it created an 
incentive for employers to adopt quotas.  Congress responded by amending Title VII in 1991, 
effectively overturning at least parts of Ward Cove.  See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 
Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2012)).   Disparate cases, such as the 
firefighters’ litigation in New Haven, continue to address written test requirements that have 
a disproportionately exclusionary effect on African-Americans.    
74Selmi, supra note 67, at 704. 
75 Id. at 795. 
76 Id. at 759. 
77 Id. at 751. 
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question of whether employers must “disturb core business” practices is not one 
about impact on women or other protected groups standing in isolation.  Instead, it 
requires establishing the principle that employers should accommodate any type of 
temporary disability for reasons that go beyond the needs of women alone, 
identifying pregnant workers with other workers experiencing temporary inability 
to lift heavy objects or to stand on their feet for long periods, and building coalitions 
rather than emphasizing women’s uniqueness in attempting to win workplace 
reforms. 78   
The argument for recognition of pregnancy-based discrimination claims 
thus became much stronger after Congress amended the ADA to broaden its 
coverage to include temporary and minor impairments, including lifting 
restrictions.79 Extending workplace protections for pregnant women requires seeing 
such protections not just as a component of discrimination against women, but as 
part of a more general effort to require employers to accommodate temporary 
disabilities.80 Such accommodations can be expensive, and they follow from a 
conclusion that the employer, rather than the employee or a state insurance fund, is 
the right place to impose the cost.  Without the principle that employers must 
accommodate disabilities,  however, pregnancy accommodations involve 
“disturbing (otherwise legitimate) core business practices”81 or they become what 
the Supreme Court termed “most favored employee” status, requiring the extension 
of workplace benefits to pregnant women in accordance with the most favorable of 
those available to other employees, an approach the Court rejected.82 
We thus identify disability (including pregnancy) accommodation as one 
example of “equality law,” that is, the identification of substantive employment 
practices inconsistent with a commitment to economic equality, and delegitimization 
of these practices as appropriate when applied to any employee. This approach, 
however, requires not just examination of the disparate impact on protected groups, 
but substantive engagement with the legitimacy of the practice on its own terms and 
a vision of what equality (aside from freedom from overt discrimination)  means.   
The signature accomplishment of feminist scholars – sexual harassment law 
– illustrates this approach.  Catharine MacKinnon successfully argued that sexual 
harassment in the workplace constitutes sex discrimination, and that it should come 
within the purview of Title VII.83  Yet, sexual harassment, once made visible, is 
                                                 
78 Schultz, supra note 66, at 1096, 1101. 
79 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 4, 122 Stat. at 3555-56 (expanding the definition 
of “disability” under the ADA and clarifying that the “definition of disability . . .   shall be 
construed in favor of broad coverage”); Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment 
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 17,014 
(Mar. 25, 2011); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2011); Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” 
and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 487 (2012). 
80 Schultz, supra note 66, at 1096 (advocating a refusal to distance the problems of pregnant 
workers from those faced by employees with other disabilities.). 
81 Selmi, supra note 67, at 751.   
82 Young v. United Parcel Serv., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
83 Sturm, supra note 17, at 480-81 (describing history of sexual harassment law). 
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illegitimate as a business practice for reasons that go beyond the impact on its 
victims; where it is pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment, it is 
also almost always an indication of poor management practices.84  Thus, a legal 
conclusion that it constitutes sex discrimination combines a judgment that it is both 
discriminatory and that the impact on women follows from unacceptable conduct. 
In this section, we have argued that antidiscrimination doctrine reflects 
underlying judgments about the substantive acceptability of workplace practices that 
have disparate effects on protected groups.  Thus, antidiscrimination law initially 
reflected a substantive determination not just to outlaw bias, but to dismantle the 
market segmentation that created exclusively white male, black male, white female, 
and black female workplaces.  In the early days of Title VII, the courts consistently 
refined and extended the doctrine where necessary to advance that purpose, thus 
making it easier to dismantle white male workplaces such as those at McDonnell-
Douglas and Duke Power.  Since then, when courts have cut back, Congress has 
reaffirmed the principle in its amendments to Title VII. 
The passage of antidiscrimination law did not, however, involve any 
comparable commitment to addressing either the means of advancement within 
integrated workplaces or the particular challenges that attend discrimination based 
on a failure to respond to (“accommodate”) pregnancy and family responsibilities.  
While, as this section has shown, Congress did eventually recognize pregnancy 
discrimination as illegal,  progress in winning employment structuring to deal with 
family responsibilities  has occurred most consistently when Congress or the courts 
have engaged the underlying legitimacy of the practices, explicitly or implicitly.  
Yet, with the waning of the more general efforts to promote economic equality in 
the postwar years, substantive engagement with the forces producing economic 
inequality has been limited.  Legal scholars and other advocates have therefore tried 
to extend the antidiscrimination principle to do more of the heavy lifting necessary 
to achieve greater equality, but where those efforts have not been combined with a 
substantive discussion of the propriety of the practices themselves, the success of 
such efforts has been limited.  Thus, the courts have been willing to use disparate 
impact theory to strike down employment tests where they have the effect of 
perpetuating segregated workplaces, which are clearly illegitimate under Title VII. 
They have been unwilling, however, to address the failure to provide pregnancy 
accommodations in the absence of either a more general requirement to include 
pregnant women in the workplace or to accommodate all temporary physical 
limitations.  The distinction is not really about “disparate impact” – both sets of 
policies have a disparate impact on certain groups.   Instead, it involves a substantive 
conception of the employer responsibility to promote equality – and of the 
                                                 
84  E.g., Mike Isaac, Inside Uber’s Aggressive, Unrestrained Workplace Culture, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/technology/uber-workplace-
culture.html; Valentina Zarya, In the Fight Against Sexual Harassment, Money Trumps 
Morals, FORTUNE (June 21, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/21/uber-kalanick-resigns/. 
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substantive propriety of the business practices that pose obstacles to full inclusion 
in the workplace. 
 
C. The Story of Title VII’s Success 
 
The antidiscrimination laws of the sixties have been successful in reducing 
gender and race-based inequality by opening what had previously been exclusively 
white male positions to women and minorities.85 In the first decade following 
adoption of Title VII, African-Americans moved into positions that had been closed 
to them, with corresponding gains in income.86  During that decade, women 
increased their workforce participation to a greater degree than other workers, but 
did so overwhelmingly in the growing number of predominately female clerical and 
service positions, and saw no substantial income gains vis-à-vis white men.87  The 
major advances for women would come instead during the eighties as women 
increased their educational levels and moved into the professions.88   
Both minority gains in the sixties and seventies, and women’s gains in the 
eighties89 vindicated the assumptions associated with the passage of 
antidiscrimination laws.90  These laws opened up the “limited portals of entry” into 
good jobs, allowed those who made it through the door to participate in the career 
ladders available once inside, and did so without necessarily undercutting the wages 
of the white men who worked beside them.91   These assumptions all began to give 
way with the changing nature of workplaces.  
By the end of the seventies, an assault began on the unionized workplaces 
that had produced the relative income equality and seniority based-advancement of 
                                                 
85 See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 17, at 460 (observing that overt, race and gender based 
classifications have become a “thing of the past” that ‘[m]any employers now have formal 
policies prohibiting race and sex discrimination, and procedures to enforce those policies”)  
86 Blumrosen, supra note 33, at 412; Gavin Wright, The Regional Economic Impact of The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 95 B.U. L. REV. 759, 776-83 (2015) (demonstrating black economic 
gains, particularly with the decline in low paid, primary black workplaces in the South).  
87 Id. The gender wage gap was 58.2% in 1968, 59.4% in 1978, and had decreased to 66% in 
1988.  National Committee on Pay Equity, The Wage Gap over Time: In Real Dollars, 
Women See a Continuing Gap (Sept. 2016), http://www.pay-equity.org/info-time.html. 
88 Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and 
Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. POL. ECON. 730, 749-50 (2002). 
89 Women benefitted more than blacks did, but blacks won the lawsuits. Tamara Lytle, Title 
VII Changed the Face of the American Workplace, 51 SHRM (May 21, 2014), 
https://www.shrm.org/publications/hrmagazine/editorialcontent/2014/0614/pages/0614-
civil-rights.aspx#sthash.g69i4wLm.dpuf 
90 See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap:  Extent, Trends, and 
Explanations 44 (2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21913.pdf (finding that Title VII had 
little effect on women’s wages immediately after it was passed, but did decrease racial 
disparities). 
91 MURRAY, supra note 29, at 175, Fig. 9.4 (showing working class white male 
unemployment rate to be below the national unemployment rate until after 1980).   
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the post-war era.92  Much greater income inequality, among white males as well as 
in the economy more generally, became the norm.  And as the economy changed, 
judges grappled with the question of the underlying meaning of antidiscrimination 
law: did it simply mandate equal treatment, dismantling the racial and gender 
classifications of earlier eras that limited access to “ports of entry,”93 or could it be 
extended to address the new forms of subordination women and minorities 
continued to face within the organizations to which they had gained entry?  Before 
examining courts’ response, we turn to an analysis of how corporate law and 
practices facilitate gender discrimination in the contemporary economy. 
 
II. COMPETITION AND GENDER IN THE NEW ECONOMY 
   
 When Congress enacted Title VII, it saw segregated workplaces as an 
impediment to racial and gender equality and an obstacle to further economic 
growth.  Today, formal segregation has been dismantled, and women and minorities 
enjoy much greater access to the entry-level positions of the new economy.  Yet, the 
source of economic inequality and of racial and gender disparities has changed, 
creating new challenges for antidiscrimination law, economic productivity, and 
societal equality.   
 Central to these changes is the transformation of the means of advancement 
in the highly paid tiers of the new economy.  Women have won access to jobs as 
prison guards and men can be flight attendants,94 but gaining a foothold into entry-
level jobs does not ensure security or advancement.    Instead, advancement depends 
to a much greater extent on competition and individualism, with management 
structures designed to reward such behavior.95  
As other scholars have argued, the law’s failure to keep up with the 
structural changes in the workplace has undermined the effectiveness of 
antidiscrimination efforts.96 They link antidiscrimination law’s failings to two 
factors that have changed the nature of career advancement: the greater role of 
flexible and subjective workplace interactions in determining raises, promotions and 
                                                 
92 See JEFFERSON COWIE, STAYIN’ ALIVE: THE 1970S AND THE LAST DAYS OF THE WORKING 
CLASS (2010). 
93 Green, supra note 39, at 99. 
94 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). 
95 Robert L. Laud & Matthew Johnson, Upward Mobility: A Typology of Tactics and 
Strategies for Career Advancement, 17 CAREER DEVEL. INT’L. 231 (2012). See also Maxine 
Eichner, Market-Cautious Feminism, 69 STUD. L., POL. & SOC’Y 141, 160 (2016) (“the 
workplace should not be conceptualized as a sphere free from hierarchy or constraint”). 
96 See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 17, at 460 (describing the structural changes as a result of 
patterns of interaction, informal norms, networking, mentoring, and evaluation.”)  Cf. 
Bagenstos, supra note 17, at 2-3 (expressing skepticism about the ability of 
antidiscrimination law to reach such subjective evaluations). 
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bonuses and the persistence of subtle or unconscious biases that reinforce gender 
stereotyping.97   
Missing from their explanations, however, is an examination of the forces 
that drive the selection process and the supposedly unconscious biases.  Their 
accounts suggest that accurate evaluations of individual employees would eliminate 
the disparities – but do not consider why gender disparities not only persist, but have 
in many cases increased most in the parts of the economy that have enjoyed that the 
greatest income growth.   It is only with this understanding that a new “equality law” 
that seeks to address these structural forces can be envisioned and that Title VII can 
remain effective. In this section, we analyze how the new economy has a disparate 
impact on women, the first step in moving towards a reconceptualization of the 
interaction between structural inequality and antidiscrimination law.   
Section A explains how the structure of workforces has changed to 
emphasize competition and individualism.  Section B documents how these changes 
have produced a shift in the gendered wage gap, with the greatest disparities now 
occurring in a relatively few places in the economy – those that have produced large 
income disparities.  Section C uses the analysis of the new economy to explain the 
gender gap.  It proposes that gender disparities have increased as women are subject 
to a reinforcing triple bind: they are less attracted to these competitive workplaces; 
they are perceived as less able to compete on the terms of the economy; and they are 
disproportionately penalized for displaying the same competitive traits the men 
demonstrate, reinforcing the disinclination to apply for the most competitive 
environments. 
 
A. Valorizing the Tournament 
 
 When Congress passed Title VII, large employers organized workers into a 
system of tiers that made it relatively easy to base antidiscrimination litigation on 
use of comparators demonstrating disparate treatment of otherwise similarly situated 
employees.   A workplace based on tiers creates pyramid-like systems of employee 
relationships that encourage employees within each tier to identify with each other 
and, assuming stable employment, with the institution itself.98  Many of the largest 
employers were manufacturers, union membership was high,99 and workers at all 
levels of income experienced similar growth.100  Moreover, even within managerial 
                                                 
97  Bagenstos, supra note 17, at 4-5. 
98 Carbone & Levit, supra note 23, at 1044-45, 1047. 
99 Almost one-third of workers belonged to unions, compared to 10% today. 50 Years of 
Shrinking Union Membership in One Map, NPR (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2015/02/23/385843576/50-years-of-shrinking-union-
membership-in-one-map. 
100 Consider that shortly after the Civil Rights Act, more than one-quarter of the workforce 
was employed in the manufacturing sector; today, it is under 10%.  U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment by Industry, 1910 and 2015 (Mar. 3, 2016), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2016/employment-by-industry-1910-and-2015.htm.   “The 
1940s to the late 1970s, while by no means a golden age (as evident, for example, by gender, 
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ranks, employees tended to be promoted from below, and they identified with 
company rather than individualistic aims.101  Monetary incentives were modest, if 
they existed at all, and corporate teams constrained self-interested behavior that did 
not serve the collective interests of the group.102  The company “man” took with him 
the status that came from association with a successful company;103 he had little 
ability to cash in and leave for greener pastures.104 
In contrast, the new system of steeply banked hierarchies encourages top 
management to identify more with shareholders than with their subordinates, 
employees to compete against each other, and both groups to focus on short term 
individual advancement rather than longer term institutional health.  Consequently, 
the “employers' compact” with workers has changed, providing much less 
protection.105 Executive compensation has become much more variable, and those 
enjoying the greatest gains do so in ways that have become more portable 106 Within 
this system, it may make (personal, even if not institutional) sense for executives to 
adopt practices that advance short term objectives even if the process undermines 
the company’s long term institutional health.107 
                                                 
ethnic, and racial discrimination in the job market), was a period in which workers from the 
lowest-paid wage earner to the highest-paid CEO experienced similar growth in incomes. 
This was a period in which “a rising tide” really did lift all boats.”  Estelle Somelleir & Mark 
Price, The Increasingly Unequal States of America: Income Inequality by State, 1917 to 
2012, ECON. POL’Y INST.  (Jan. 26, 2015),  http://www.epi.org/publication/income-
inequality-by-state-1917-to-2012/.  
101 Carbone & Levit, supra note 23, at 1045 n.61 and accompanying text; see also Wells, 
supra note 27, at 323-24 (2013) (observing that even Harvard Business School emphasized 
this idea of stewardship). 
102 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 147 (1967) (observing that 
while corporate officers often owned stock or stock options, and had access to information 
from which they could personally benefit, they rarely acted to advance their individual 
pecuniary interests at the expense of the firm). 
103 Carbone & Levit, supra note 23, at 1047 n.78 and accompanying text. 
104 See, e.g., LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 94 n. lxix 
(Gregory Elliott trans., 2007). 
105  RICK WARTZMAN, THE END OF LOYALTY: THE RISE AND FALL OF GOOD JOBS IN 
AMERICA 312 (2017).  For arguments that employee tenure, from the C-suite to the factory 
floor,  has diminished over the past thirty years, see Matthew Bidwell, What Happened to 
Long-Term Employment? The Role of Worker Power and Environmental Turbulence in 
Explaining Declines in Worker Tenure, 24 ORG. SCI. 1061 (2013); see also Guy Berger, Will 
This Year’s College Graduates Job-Hop More Than Previous Grads? (Apr. 12, 2016), 
https://blog.linkedin.com/2016/04/12/will-this-year_s-college-grads-job-hop-more-than-
previous-grads (over the last twenty years, the number of companies college graduates 
worked for in the first five years after graduation doubled).  
106 WARTZMAN, supra note 105, at 305-06. 
107 See, e.g., June Carbone, Once and Future Financial Crises: How the Hellhound of Wall 
Street Sniffed Out Five Forgotten Factors Guaranteed to Produce Fiascos, 80 UMKC L. 
Rev. 1021, 1027 (2012) (“If the owners can realize sufficient benefit today, the fact that the 
company will be worth nothing tomorrow will not matter and it will skew their decision-
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The new system involves three mutually reinforcing practices.  First, the 
managerial system has been replaced with a system that promotes “shareholder 
primacy,”108 thereby changing the institutional focus of publicly traded corporations 
away from the long term interests of the institutions and toward the short-term 
interests of shareholders.109 “Short-termism”110 separates the interests of 
shareholders and executives from those of other corporate constituents such as 
employees and customers.111  It also undermines the link between institutions and 
investment in the future, as corporate officers focus to a greater degree on immediate 
payoffs, and less on investment in either employee training or research with longer 
term payoffs.112  A 2005 survey of 401 financial executives, for example, reported 
that an overwhelming majority (78%) would take actions that lowered the value of 
their companies to create a smooth earnings stream.113 More than 80% of the 
respondents further stated that they would decrease spending on advertising, 
maintenance, and research and development expenses to meet short-term objectives 
such earnings targets.114  Another study, which looked at 6,642 companies in a 
variety of industries during the period from 1986 to 2005, similarly found an 
emphasis on short-termism: the firms increased reported earnings, which in turn 
influence stock prices, by cutting support for research and development and 
                                                 
making in favor of activities that increase short term profits even at the expense of the 
company's survival.”). 
108 Lynn Stout describes shareholder primary as an “ideology” that “led to a number of 
individually modest but collectively significant changes in corporate law and practice that 
had the practical effect of driving directors and executives in public corporations to focus on 
share price as their guiding star.”  Stout, supra note 9, at 1177–78.   While this dogma 
increased the emphasis on share price as the principal measure of company (and thus 
executive) success, it also had the effect of increasing CEO power vis-à-vis other company 
stakeholders such as employers.  See William K. Black & June Carbone, Economic Ideology 
and the Rise of the Firm as a Criminal Enterprise, 49 AKRON L. REV. 371, 397, n. 155 (2016).  
And since it does not necessarily promote long term institutional health, it is not necessarily 
in the interests of the interests of all shareholders.  See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the 
Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 320-21 (2012).  
109 Carbone & Levit, supra note 23, at 1034. 
110 See Dallas, supra note 108, at 320-21. 
111 See, e.g., HILL & PAINTER, supra note 12, at 102-03 (describing change in banking that 
emphasizes making money at customers’ expense). 
112 See infra in text at note 312 the discussion of the BlackRock Letter.  These pressures have 
also contributed to the creation of a more contingent workforce, as companies mechanize or 
outsource labor (whether overseas or to the janitorial firm down the street) to transfer the 
costs associated with variable demand to others.  See BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 
104, at 73-74 (describing this outsourcing as part of the process of creating “leaner” 
organizations).   
113 John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, & Shiva Rajgoapl, et al., Value Destruction and 
Financial Reporting Decisions, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27, 33 (2006). 
114 Id. at 31. 
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marketing, even where such practices did not advance the firms’ medium to longer 
term interests.115    
Within this system, executive compensation has become exponentially 
higher and more steeply banked in the upper management ranks in an effort to align 
executive and shareholder interests.  The increase in the ratio of chief executive 
officer compensation to average worker pay, for example, went from twenty in 1965 
to 331 in 2013.116   The principle component of executive compensation takes the 
form of stock options, which increase in value with quarterly earnings, which in turn 
influence share price in publically traded companies.117  Moreover, corporate 
boards, which have become more influential, emphasize share value as a measure of 
CEO success,118 while hedge funds and other activist investors target what they 
perceive to be underperforming firms.119  The result creates powerful incentives that 
separate the interests of CEOs and shareholders from other corporate stakeholders. 
Second, this emphasis on the CEO’s need to produce immediate results has 
contributed to the adoption of merit pay and bonus systems that rank employees and 
introduce greater pay variations among employees at comparable levels of an 
organization.  These incentive systems allow a CEO to reorient a firm’s priorities,120 
rewarding employees who quickly adopt management aims, even if such objectives 
are ill-considered or at odds with the company’s established ethos or ethical 
standards.121  The incentive systems may employ subjective evaluations that 
                                                 
115 Dallas, supra note 108, at 280.  
116 Executive Paywatch: High-Paid CEOs and the Low-Wage Economy, AFL-CIO, 
http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2014 (last visited Nov. 11, 2016); Pay 
Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9877, Exchange Act Release No. 75610, 80 
Fed. Reg. 50,104 (Aug. 18, 2015); Biagio Marino, Note, Show Me the Money: The CEO Pay 
Ratio Disclosure Rule and the Quest for Effective Executive Compensation Reform, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1355 (2016); Robert J. Rhee, Intrafirm Monitoring of Executive 
Compensation, 69 VAND. L. REV. 695, 696 (2016). 
117 See generally MICHAEL DORFF, INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY 
EXPERIMENT FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT (2014) (discussing the process underlying increase 
in CEO compensation); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, too Much Deference: Behavioral 
Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673 (2005). 
118 See Dallas, supra note 108, at 267(calling this “short-termism”). 
119 Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism 
by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 75, 80-82 (2011) (noting that a high percentage of 
publicly traded companies experience pressure to increase short term earnings because of the 
role of hedge funds and other activist investors). 
120 See, e.g., William K. Black, The Department of Justice “Chases Mice While Lions Roam 
the Campsite”: Why the Department Has Failed to Prosecute the Elite Frauds That Drove 
the Financial Crisis, 80 UMKC L. REV. 987, 992 (2012) (observing that the CEOs controls 
the company's compensation systems and “can reserve bonuses for those who ‘get with the 
program,’ demoralizing others or persuading them to leave.”); see also Commentary: Jack 
Welch, ‘Rank-and-Yank?’ That’s Not How It’s Done, supra note 8 (defending such systems 
as way to encourage employees to define their efforts in terms of management objectives). 
121 Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their 
Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 
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increase management discretion or reductionist ones tied to easily measured factors 
such as sales or unit profitability.122  Perhaps the most notorious of these evaluation 
systems is “rank and yank,” a system Jack Welch initially introduced at General 
Electric, and the type of system at the core of the Microsoft litigation.123  The “yank” 
part of the system, which seeks to repeatedly cull low performing employees, has 
received the sharpest criticism, and many companies have abandoned it, although 
they have retained ranking in some form.124  Yet, the ranking part of the system has 
negative effects even if the company does not seek to fire or replace employees.  
Lynne Dallas observes that systems that use rankings to justify large disparities in 
compensation tend to produce greater emphasis on self-interest, higher levels of 
distrust that undermine teamwork, greater homogeneity in the selection of corporate 
management, less managerial accountability and more politicized decision-
making.125  In short, supposedly meritocratic bonus systems have been found to 
replicate many of the attributes of “old boys clubs” that protect insiders at the 
expense of outsiders.126 
Third, these changes in corporate orientation alter the qualities that lead to 
career advancement. The modern CEO selection process prizes the “charismatic” 
leader, who is seen as having “the power to perform miracles – to bring a dying 
company back to life, for instance, or to vanquish much larger, more powerful 
                                                 
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 37 (2003) (describing how Enron management using its bonus system to 
reorient company behavior in counterproductive ways).   
122 Both, for example, have led to greater gender disparities in doctor’s compensation.  Where 
reductionist measures are used, such as the number of Medicare procedures billed, male 
doctors tend to bill more procedures than female doctors do, in part because male doctors 
care more about compensation. Andrew Fitch, Why Women Doctors Make Half of What Men 
Do: Medicare’s Doctor Gender Pay Gap, NERDWALLET (Apr. 22, 2014), 
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/health/doctor-salary-gender-pay-gap/.  Where the 
subjective evaluations determine salaries, male doctors also do better than female doctors 
do.  See Anunpam B. Jena et al., Sex Differences in Physician Salary in US Public Medical 
Schools, 176 JAMA INTERN MED. 1294 
(2016), http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2532788. 
123 Jack Welch, who justified rank and yank as a way of aligning employee incentives with 
firm objectives, is notorious for the use of earnings  management to manipulate short terms 
share prices.  See ROGER F. MARTIN, FIXING THE GAME: BUBBLES, CRASHES, AND WHAT 
CAPITALISM CAN LEARN FROM THE NFL 29, 97 (2011).  Enron also used the rank and yank 
system.  See, e.g., PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON 
51-52 (2002). 
124 Max Nisen, Why Stack Ranking Is a Terrible Way to Motivate Employees, BUS. INSIDER, 
Nov. 15, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/stack-ranking-employees-is-a-bad-idea-
2013-11 (observing that while 49% of companies reported that they used “stack ranking 
systems in 2009, . . . by 2011, only 14% used them.”) Nisen reports, however, that most 
employees are still rated or ranked, just not on a mandatory curve. Id. 
125 Dallas, supra note 121, at 37.   
126 Although as Dallas emphasizes, the system often produces a “young boys’ club,” in which 
CEOs recruit ambitious new hires, who “want to make a lot of money fast.” Id. at 50.  The 
new employees, especially if they have limited experience elsewhere, more readily buy into 
shifts in corporate orientation.  Id. at 49. 
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foes.”127   As companies place greater confidence in the external executive market, 
they also invest less in their own managers, and increase the emphasis on lateral 
hires at more junior levels as well.128 The ability to move in turn becomes necessary 
to upward advancement.  And the ability to move drives up the wages of the mobile 
and creates incentives to look out for self-interest rather than invest in the 
company.129  This further redefines the qualities associated with the ideal executive 
who can impress in an interview and the process that determines compensation, as a 
larger part of overall compensation depends on negotiated salaries or annual 
bonuses.130  Moreover, it builds in rewards for those who can have an immediate 
impact and then move on to the next position.  Loyalty to an institution no longer 
matters.131 
The financial sector, whose influence has also disproportionately grown 
with these changes,132 has shifted toward such norms at least as dramatically if not 
more than other companies have.  Michael Lewis, for example, in his 1989 book 
about Salomon Brothers, Liar’s Poker, wrote about the celebration of the “big 
swinging dick.”133  He described his well-paid class of traders, hired right out of Ivy 
League colleges, as acting “more like students in a junior high school.”134  The ethos, 
as the name big swinging dick suggests, combined a glorification of cleverness and 
gamesmanship with signs of masculinity;135 serving customer interests was not part 
of the path toward advancement.136 The change came not only with the switch from 
                                                 
127 Rakesh Khurana, The Curse of the Superstar CEO, HARV. BUS. REV. 60, 62 (Sept. 2002). 
128 RAKESH KHURANA, CORPORATE SAVIOR: SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR 196 
(2002) (describing the erosion of institutional commitment to managers and the increased 
reliance on search firms for lower level executives). 
129 Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and 
Multitasking (Mar. 2013), 
http://www.princeton.edu/~rbenabou/papers/Multitasking%20March%2019%20paper.pdf. 
130 Id. at ix (describing shift from emphasis on internal to external candidates); see also 
BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 104, at 93, 94-95 (observing that “acquisition of 
experience increases personal capital and thus employability,” but that it also increases 
opportunism and self-interested behavior).   
131 WARTZMAN, supra note 105, passim; see Naomi Schoenbaum, The Family and the Market 
at Wal-Mart, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 759 (2013) 
132 See, e.g., William Lazonick, The Financialization of the U.S. Corporation: What Has 
Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 858 (2013) (describing 
financialization in terms in the increased influence of institutional investors and hedge funds 
on corporate policy).   
133 MICHAEL LEWIS, LIARS POKER 56 (1989). 
134 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 12, at 98. 
135Id. at 99; see also Christine Sgarlata Chung, From Lily Bart to the Boom-Boom Room: 
How Wall Street's Social and Cultural Response to Women Has Shaped Securities 
Regulation, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 175, 177 (2010) (describing the trading desk as “a 
highly competitive and male-dominated environment where posters of pinup girls and strip 
club outings were not unheard of”). 
136  HILL & PAINTER, supra note 12,  at 102-03 (describing Goldman Sachs’s practices of 
fleecing its customers and noting that  neither the individual trader’s nor the bank’s 
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partnership to corporate form in Wall Street firms,137 but with the ability to create 
complex, opaque financial products– and to profit from them at the expense of less 
sophisticated customers.138   Potential clients, who were often at the losing ends of 
the trades, nonetheless sought to be associated with the winners of these high stakes 
status competitions. 139  
The changes within professions have been less dramatic, but they are not 
immune from the tournament mentality:   big law firms have become more like 
businesses,140 and differences in doctors’ compensation have also become more 
variable.141 
 Taken together, these changes create more hierarchical and variable 
compensation systems; no two employees in a company may necessarily earn the 
same salary, with disparities increasing as one climbs the management ladder.142  In 
addition, they often change corporate workplaces that once prized loyalty and 
teamwork into competitive contests that pit workers against each other, and turn the 
executives who emerge from the process into “hyper-motivated survivors” of the 
contest-like evaluation process.143  The system rewards those who put their own 
interests ahead of the group and who focus more on immediate financial rewards 
than on either a service orientation or the institution’s long-term interests.144  The 
                                                 
reputation was necessarily hurt by being associated with this conduct so long as the behavior 
was associated with the “smartest” bankers). 
137 Claire Hill & Richard W. Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why 
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 
1177-78 (2010).   
138  HILL & PAINTER, supra note 12, at 85-86, 90 (describing the perceived connection 
between “cleverness” and “winning,” sophisticated products and appetite for risk). 
139  Id. at 19 (indicating the emphasis on selling the most complex products to the least 
sophisticated parties); 103 (discussing the fact that the neither the individual traders nor the 
bank’s reputation was necessarily hurt by being associated with this conduct so long as the 
behavior was associated with the “smartest” bankers). 
140 Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 751 (2010).  See also  
Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and 
the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2263 (2010) 
(observing that “competitive meritocracy” is being replaced by a “hypercompetitive 
ideology” that, compared with its predecessor, puts more emphasis on 24/7 client-centered 
representation, complete loyalty and devotion to the firm and its clients, and maximizing 
profit per partner, and less emphasis on meritocracy, the exercise of professional judgment, 
and cultivation of professional culture and maintaining a sustainable work-life balance and 
this shift disadvantages women). 
141 Bonnie Darves, Physician Compensation Models: The Basics, the Pros and the Cons, 
NEJM CAREER CTR. (Oct. 18,  2011), http://www.nejmcareercenter.org/article/physician-
compensation-models-the-basics-the-pros-and-the-cons/ (indicating that physician 
compensation has become more based on bonuses).  
142  Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 26. 
143  Ribstein, supra note 7, at 9. 
144 See David W. Hart & Jeffery A. Thompson, Untangling Employee Loyalty: A 
Psychological Contract Perspective, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 297-323 (2007) (observing that 
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new system is responsible for the shift from the pyramid structure of compensation 
in the manufacturing age to a more steeply banked system in which those at the top 
earn dramatically more than anyone else does.  While this new system arguably 
disadvantages the majority of workers at the expense of the few, it also imperils the 
gains women have made in the workforce and will undermine their position even 
more in the future.   
 
B. The New Economy and the Gender Wage Gap  
 
The changing workplace has created dramatically greater income inequality 
in American society, with increasing concern about the staggering increases in top 
salaries, compression at the bottom, and the hollowing out of the middle class.145  
The subject of much less commentary, however, has been the impact on women.  
They have lost ground in the areas of the economy where incomes have increased 
most.   
Looking at overall measures of the gendered gap in income would seem to 
tell a story of progress; that gap has narrowed substantially over the last half century.  
Yet, as a measure of women’s economic standing, the composite numbers are 
misleading.  While the wage gap has narrowed, it has done so overwhelmingly at 
the bottom, in part because of the drop in blue collar male wages. 146   Since 1990, 
the gendered wage gap has grown where it matters most – at the top.  In 1990, the 
gendered gap in wages did not vary much by education; to the extent that there was 
a difference, college graduate women earned a slightly higher percentage of the male 
wage than less educated women.147  Today, that relationship has reversed; the 
percentage of the male wage that female college graduates earns has declined, while 
it has increased for all other women.148   
This is precisely where there has been the most substantial growth in income 
inequality in the United States.   Between 2000 and 2014, weekly wages for the top 
10% of the workforce rose by 9.7%, the place where women had “lost substantial 
ground,” while falling 3.7% for workers in the lowest tenth of the earnings 
distribution, and 3% for those in the lowest quarter.149 
                                                 
employee loyalty is harder to come by in companies that do not offer secure employment, 
income, and benefits). 
145 See Lazonick, supra note 132, at 857-59; see also Noah, supra note 21 (addressing 
economic inequality more generally). 
146 See Derek Thompson, Why the Gender-Pay Gap Is Largest for the Highest-Paying Jobs, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/the-
sticky-floor-why-the-gender-wage-gap-is-lowest-for-the-worst-paying-jobs/383863/. 
147 RETHINKING CAPITALISM, supra note 10.  
148 See June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How Family Law Fails in a 
New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 872 (2011) (documenting a shift in the 
gendered wage gap). 
149 Drew Desilver, For Most Workers, Real Wages Have Barely Budged for Decades, Pew 
Research Center (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/09/for-
most-workers-real-wages-have-barely-budged-for-decades/. 
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The most dramatic changes in income were at the absolute top, the place 
where women are the least represented.150   By 2014, total average CEO 
compensation for the largest firms had reached $16.3 million.151  These increases in 
compensation between the late seventies and 2014 constituted an increase of 997%, 
double the increase in the stock market and the 10.9% growth in average 
compensation over the same period.152  Women’s representation in these ranks has 
remained small.  Although women constitute almost half of all workers, they are 
only 4% of the CEOs of Fortune 500 Companies,153 “8.1% of the country's top 
earners,” and only 14-16% “of corporate executive officers, law firm equity partners, 
and senior management in Silicon Valley.”154   Even if they make it into the CEO 
ranks, the women “earn 46% less than their male counterparts, after adjusting for 
age and education.”155 
The financial sector exhibits a similar pattern of disproportionate increase 
in compensation and a widening gender gap.  In the post-war era, compensation in 
the financial sector increased in step with other industries,156 while between 1982 
and 2007 average annual compensation in the financial sector doubled at a time 
when compensation in the rest of the economy grew only modestly.157  Yet, the 
financial sector shows greater gender disparities than anywhere else:  an analysis of 
personal financial advisors, for example, shows that women earn 58.4 cents on the 
dollar compared to men, a larger gap than among men when the same measurements 
                                                 
150 Noah, supra note 21 (describing increases in compensation in the financial sector and the 
top executive ranks as the primary sources of income inequality in the country.). 
151 As with other sectors, the disparities between top firms and others often exacerbate 
differences in compensation.  Executive Paywatch: High-Paid CEOs and the Low-Wage 
Economy, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2014 (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2016). 
152 Lawrence Mishel & Alyssa Davis, Top CEOs Make 200 Times More than Typical 
Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 21, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/top-ceos-
make-300-times-more-than-workers-pay-growth-surpasses-market-gains-and-the-rest-of-
the-0-1-percent/. 
153 Catalyst, Statistical Overview of Women in the Workforce (2016), 
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/statistical-overview-women-workforce. 
154  Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 923 (2016). 
155 Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 25. 
156 June Carbone, Once and Future Financial Crises: How the Hellhound of Wall Street 
Sniffed Out Five Forgotten Factors Guaranteed to Produce Fiascos, 80 UMKC L. REV. 
1021, 1057 (2012). 
157 Id. at 1057-58. Earnings in the top executive ranks of the financial sector increased even 
more. By 2005, executive pay in the financial industry averaged $3.5 million a year, the 
highest of any industry in the United States. Id. at 1058.  And while financial sector income 
plummeted in the immediate wake of the financial crisis, earnings have since rebounded.  
See Donald Tomaskovic-Devey & Ken-Hou Lin, Financialization: Causes, Inequality 
Consequences, and Policy Implications, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 167, 175-76 (2013). 
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are used158 and other surveys find similar gaps among insurance agents, security 
sales agents, financial managers, and clerks.159  Moreover, as compensation within 
the financial sector soared, the representation of women has declined.  During the 
nineties, women initially won access to key financial jobs through litigation, but 
despite increasing numbers of female M.B.A.s, their numbers on Wall Street 
dropped after 2000,160 as did their representation in venture capital firms like Kleiner 
Perkins.161 
Outside of these top positions, incomes – and gender disparities – have also 
steadily risen in the professional and managerial positions that command the highest 
salaries – and that tend to be the most competitive.162   For example, following the 
financial sector positions, the next highest disparities tend to come for marketing 
and sales managers, who are often paid on commission, where it is 65.8%, followed 
by physicians and surgeons, 71.0, management analysts 74.9, and lawyers 77.1.163    
Doctors provide a particularly puzzling example because gender gaps have 
grown not only in total income, 164 but also in starting salaries, even after controlling 
for education, specialty, and hours worked.165  As with other positions, the 
disparities among doctors tend to be the highest in the most profitable specialties, 
such as orthopedic surgery and among other surgical subspecialties.166  Moreover, 
gender differences are greatest in the markets, such as Charlotte, S.C., that have the 
highest average levels of physician pay, replicating the patterns in other industries 
of the highest gender gaps in the most lucrative jobs.167  In addition, studies find 
                                                 
158 See Thompson, supra note 146. For more recent figures, see Am. Ass’n Univ. Women 
supra note 22 (showing financial sector as still characterized by the largest gender gaps in 
compensation). 
159 Indeed, this study found that the six occupations with the largest gender gaps were all in 
the financial sector.  Alexander Eichler, Gender Wage Gap Is Higher on Wall Street than 
Anywhere Else, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/19/gender-wage-gap-wall-street_n_1362878.html. 
160 Id. 
161 Giang, supra note 1. 
162 See Am. Ass’n Univ. Women, supra note 22. 
163 Id. 
164 Indeed, looking at doctors as a group, the gendered wage is worse than for other 
professions, with female physicians and surgeons making only 59.1% of the incomes earned 
by their male peers. Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 24. 
165 Anthony T. Lo Sasso et al., The $16,819 Pay Gap for Newly Trained Physicians: The 
Unexplained Trend of Men Earning More than Women, 30 HEALTH AFF. 193201 (2011). 
166Anunpam B. Jena et al., Sex Differences in Physician Salary in US Public Medical 
Schools, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1294 
(2016), http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2532788 (finding 
gender-based differences in compensation after controlling for  physician age, years of 
experience, specialty, faculty rank, several measures of research productivity, and payments 
by Medicare). 
167 “Researchers found that the average national gender pay gap among survey respondents 
was 26.5 percent, or more than $91,000 a year, after controlling for specialty, geography, 
years of experience, and reported weekly work hours.”   Christina Cauterucci, The Gender 
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gender disparities where compensation is based on subjective evaluations or 
reductionist measures of procedures billed.168  
Among lawyers, overall pay has increased since 1990 in accordance with a 
double-humped system in which the compensation of top law firm partners grew 
substantially while other lawyers saw more modest increases in salaries.169  While 
there is a gender wage gap of 22.9% among female and male lawyers as a whole, 
among partners in the largest firms, there is a 44% differential in pay.170  As is true 
of other highly paid sectors, the gender gap is highest at the high end of the pay 
scale. 
In light of the increasing gender pay differences in the sectors of the 
economy that have contributed the most to growing inequality, the question is 
whether antidiscrimination law can address these differences.  The answer involves 
further examination of the shift to more negative sum competitions and individualist 
employment environments.  
 
C. The New System of Negative Competition and Gender 
 
Most analyses of the “glass ceiling” that blocks the movement of women 
into upper management positions focus on ways to ensure the promotion of women 
on the same terms that apply to the men.171  Such an approach to gender 
discrimination focuses on the seeming neutrality of the more competitive 
marketplace, thus placing its impact outside of the scope of Title VII law. 
 Instead, this section shows that the more general forces that produce the new 
marketplace – and greater economic inequality –  are deeply gendered, and are thus 
subject to challenge under Title VII.  Yet, antidiscrimination efforts, which decry 
the gender disparities, have not directly engaged the validity of the practices 
                                                 
Pay Gap in Medicine is Abominable; Here’s Where It’s Worst, SLATE (Mar. 26, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2017/04/26/the_gender_pay_gap_in_medicine_is_ab
ominable_here_s_where_it_s_worst.html. 
168 By “reductionist,” we mean measures such as procedures billed without controlling for 
other considerations, such as whether the procedures were medically indicated or otherwise 
appropriate.  Charlotta Weaver et al., A Matter of Priorities? Exploring the Persistent 
Gender Pay Gap in Hospital Medicine, 10 J. HOSP. MED. 486 (2015) (indicating that at least 
part of the explanation was that women doctors cared less about money).  Indeed, the 
disparities are particularly large in Medicare reimbursements where female doctors make 
half of what male doctors do, in large part because male doctors, who appear to be more 
focused on the bottom line, perform more procedures and see more patients.  Fitch, supra 
note 122. 
169 Elizabeth Olson, A 44% Pay Divide for Male and Female Law Partner, Survey Says, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016),  http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/business/dealbook/female-
law-partners-earn-44-less-than-the-men-survey-
shows.html?mabReward=CTM&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&region=CColumn&mo
dule=Recommendation&src=rechp&WT.nav=RecEngine. 
170 Id. 
171 SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD (2013). 
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associated with greater inequality (winner take all bonus systems, short-termism, 
and highly competitive workplaces).  It is the separation of the two that intrinsically 
limits the effectiveness of antidiscrimination approaches.   
This section begins by examining the gendered impact of the shift toward 
more competitive workplaces, second, explores the impact on the qualities 
associated with the winners of such competitions, and third, considers the negative 
evaluation of women in such environments.  This means that women face a triple, 
not just a double, bind.172 
 
1. Selection Effects Part I: Gender Differences in Competitive Environments 
 
The primary question for purposes of the intersection between anti- 
inequality and antidiscrimination law is accounting for the growth of gender 
disparities in the highest-paid professions.   Almost all of the accounts, whether they 
view these changes as pernicious or benign,173 emphasize that as differences in 
compensation have become more extreme, the competition for top jobs has 
increased,174 and that increased competition produces greater gender differences.175 
This section considers why simply increasing the level of competition to get, keep 
and prosper from these jobs may have gendered effects.   
The conventional explanation for the disproportionate lack of women in the 
highest earning sector in the economy is that women are less likely to apply because 
of the emphasis on long hours, greater risk and even differences in taste for 
competition.  Each of these explanations may have a degree of plausibility; but each 
also cloaks the artificial nature of the competitions that have been created. These 
competitions often discourage women from applying not because they involve 
competition per se, but because the competitions valorize stereotypically male traits 
associated with the promotion of self-interest at the expense of collaboration.176    
                                                 
172 See supra text at notes 23-24 (defining the triple bind). 
173 See supra sources in notes 7-11. 
174 See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 121, at 50, 53 (describing the effect of Enron’s bonus system 
in undermining teamwork, increasing the focus on self-interest, and making employees more 
competitive toward and distrustful of each other). 
175 See, e.g., Marta M. Elvira & Mary E. Graham, Not Just a Formality: Pay System 
Formalization and Sex-Related Earnings Effects, 13 ORG. SCI. 601 (2002) (finding that 
bonus pay systems produce more gender disparities than systems that give greater weight to 
base pay); Paul Gompers et al., Gender Effects in Venture Capital 5 (May 12, 2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2445497 (observing that women tend 
to do better in more formal or “bureaucratic” pay systems). 
176 Mary Anne Case provides a particularly effective example of this when she describes how 
the persistence of counterproductive traits in the selection of police officers (aggressiveness, 
self-assuredness and reliance on physical strength) reflected the definition of the police office 
role in terms of stereotypical masculine traits even when other approaches to policing that 
emphasized different traits (e.g., the de-escalation of conflict) were more effective.  Mary 
Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate 
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 85-94 (1995).  Case notes 
further some of the most effective recommendations for reform came from recognition of the 
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The emphasis on male-defined competition then produces self-reinforcing effects 
that create even less supportive environments for women.  Women who accurately 
perceive that they will not be treated fairly in such environments – or may not wish 
to work in such environments even if they are welcomed  –  become that much less 
likely to apply.177 
First, when it comes to working longer hours,178 women, particularly those 
with young children, often do not apply.179  Longer hours certainly provide part of 
the answer.180   As the economy has shifted toward more winner-take-all 
compensation systems, part of the competition has taken the form of hours – and the 
longer the hours, the more women tend to drop out of the competition.181  Hours 
have in fact increased, and they have increased most at the top of the income 
ladder.182   During the Great Compression from the forties through the seventies, 
blue-collar workers and white-collar workers worked about the same number of 
hours.183  Today, the highest earning employees work much longer hours than the 
                                                 
abuses the led to the Rodney King case rather than simply consideration of women’s interests 
taken in isolation. Id. 
177 E.g, FINE, supra note 24, at 121 (in one study of a consulting firm, “women on average 
were less willing than men to make sacrifices for their career, and to take career risks in order 
to get ahead. Closer examination revealed that this was because women tend to perceive less 
benefit in taking risks and making sacrifices. But this was not because they were simply less 
ambitious. Rather, they had lower expectations of success, fewer role models, less support, 
and less confidence that their organization was a meritocracy”). 
178 Marianne Bertrand, Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Dynamics of the Gender Gap 
for Young Professionals in the Financial and Corporate Sectors, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED 
ECON. 228 (2010), http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.228. 
179 See, e.g., Deborah M. Weiss, All Work Cultures Discriminate, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN'S 
L.J. 247, 264 (2013) (citing Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, Do Women Shy Away from 
Competition? Do Men Compete too Much?, 122 Q.J. ECON. 1067, 1078, 1097 (2007)). 
180 More competitive environments which increase the emphasis on long or inflexible hours 
disadvantage women more than men.  In some cases, such as women’s decision to elect 
pharmacy as a profession, hours are a decisive factor controlling for other measures. See, 
e.g., Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Most Egalitarian of All Professions: 
Pharmacy and the Evolution of a Family-Friendly Occupation, Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res. 
Working Paper No. 18410 (Sept. 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18410. In many cases, 
though, long hours become a product of competition itself rather than an inevitable job 
characteristic.  See Jerry A. Jacobs & Kathleen Gerson, Who Are the Overworked 
Americans?, 56 REV. SOC. ECON. 442, 457 (1998) (describing the way that changes in hours 
worked corresponds with income inequality). 
181 Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Transitions:  Career and Family Life Cycles of the 
Educational Elite, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 363 (2008) (an 18-month break during ten years of 
working results in decreased earnings of 41%); see also Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, 
The Cost of Workplace Flexibility for High-Powered Professionals, 638 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 45 (2011). 
182 Bertrand, Goldin & Katz, supra note 178. 
183. Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 180, at 457 (observing that in 1965, leisure time did not 
vary by class). 
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average worker does.184  Women still bear disproportionate responsibility for child 
care,185 and when women’s hours exceed 45 hours a week, it undermines their 
relationships.186  Elite men continue to be more likely to earn more than their wives 
to a greater degree than other working couples, increasing the pressure on high 
income wives to cut back,.187 These are, of course, so much more than just private 
choices.  Indeed, Wisconsin repealed its Equal Pay Act, with a state senator who 
backed the measure insisting that men and women have different goals in life and 
money “is more important for men” while women refuse to work 50 or 60 hours a 
week because of their greater involvement in childrearing.188    
An actual job-based need to work longer hours, however, cannot provide the 
entire answer for increasing gender disparities in top positions.  For one thing, 
gender disparities persist even when researchers examined only white college 
graduates with fifteen years of experience who worked fulltime.189  The long hours 
themselves may reflect more competitive environments rather than increased 
productivity.190  In addition, managers cannot necessarily tell whether workers who 
claim to work longer hours are in fact doing so, and one study found that men were 
three times more likely than women to ease up on hours without having it effect their 
performance reviews; in short, they were more likely to “pass” as workaholics.191  
Consequently, while long hours do affect gender disparities, the longer hours may 
reflect increased competition as much if not more than workplace needs.   
Numerous management studies focus on other gender differences in 
corporate advancement.  Some suggest, for example, that women are more risk 
averse than men or that they lack the confidence (some would say hubris) that comes 
                                                 
184 David R. Francis, Why High Earners Work Longer Hours, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, http://www.nber.org/digest/jul06/w11895.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2017). 
185 Claudia Goldin, A Grand Gender Convergence, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1091, 1111-13; 
(2014); Working Long Hours Is Way Worse for Women’s Health than for Men’s, FORTUNE 
(June 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/17/women-health-work/.  
186 PAUL R. AMATO, ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER: HOW MARRIAGE IN AMERICA IS CHANGING 
104 (2009). 
187 See id.; JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS 
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 98 (2014).  
188 JOANNA GROSSMAN, NINE-TO-FIVE 299 (2016). 
189 Goldin, supra note 185, at 1116-17; see also Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The 
U.S. Gender Pay Gap in the 1990’s: Slowing Convergence, 60 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 45, 
62 (2006), http://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/handle/88435/dsp01gb19f581g. 
190 Sarah Green Carmichael, The Research Is Clear: Long Hours Backfire for People and for 
Companies, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 19, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/08/the-research-is-
clear-long-hours-backfire-for-people-and-for-companies; Wald, supra note 140, at 1271-72 
(explaining the emphasis on long hours at law firms as the product of an ideological shift). 
191 Neil Irwin, How Some Men Fake an 80 Hour Workweek and Why It Matters, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/upshot/how-some-men-fake-an-80-
hour-workweek-and-why-it-matters.html. 
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from success.192  These studies, however, have been subject to withering criticism193 
and do not necessarily take context into account: male and female entrepreneurs and 
managers, for example, do not vary in risk propensities or in their success in 
managing risk. 194  
Many social science explanations focus on the taste for competition itself.   
In fact, almost all studies show that higher pay tied to performance measures and 
wants ads emphasizing competitive environments increase the percentage of men 
who apply.195  Laboratory studies using a general population indicate that the effect 
of competition on gender-based preferences may be independent of the individual’s 
orientation toward risk or confidence in her performance.196  For example, when 
given a choice between performing a task on a non-competitive piece-rate basis 
versus in a contest, 73% of the men selected the contest, while only 35% of the 
women did so.197 Yet, these studies do not necessarily take the level and type of 
competition into account.  For example, some studies distinguish between 
“hypercompetitives,” who strive for domination and control over others, versus 
“personal development competitors,” who are concerned with the feelings and 
welfare of others.198  
Nonetheless, these differences in preferences, whatever their sources, can 
affect the gender composition of workplaces.  Advertising that emphasizes 
competitive traits, for example, tends to increase the percentage of male applicants, 
199 and the greater percentage of men may make the environments less attractive to 
                                                 
192 Blau & Kahn, supra note 90, at 42-44 (surveying literature on confidence and risk 
aversion). 
193 See, e.g., JULIE A. NELSON, GENDER AND RISK-TAKING: ECONOMICS, EVIDENCE, AND 
WHY THE ANSWER MATTERS (2017).  
194 Blau & Kahn, supra note 189 (indicating that male and female managers and 
entrepreneurs did not differ in risk propensities). 
195  Id. at 36 n.60, 37-38, (indicating that controlling for differences in attitudes toward 
competition among business students accounted for part of the gendered wage gap); id. at 41 
(describing study that found that “the more heavily the compensation package tilted towards 
rewarding the individual’s performance relative to a coworker’s performance, the more the 
applicant pool shifted to being more male dominated.”). 
196 Niederle & Vesterlund, supra note 179, at 1078, 1097; see also Jeffrey Flory, Andreas 
Leibbrandt, &  John A. List, Do Competitive Workplaces Deter Female Workers? A Large-
Scale Natural Field Experiment on Gender Differences on Job Entry Decisions, 82 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 122 (2014)(indicating the gender gap in applications more than doubles when 
a large fraction of the wage (50%) depends on relative performance, reflecting greater 
female than male aversion to such environments). 
197 Deborah M. Weiss, All Work Cultures Discriminate, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 247, 
264 (2013) (citing Niederle & Vesterlund, supra note 179, at 1078, 1097). 
198 Richard M. Ryckman, Cary R. Libby, Bart Van Den Borne, Joel A. Gold, Marc A. 
Lindner, Values of Hypercompetitive and Personal Development Competitive Individuals, 
69 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 271 (1997); see also FINE, supra note 24, at 151-72 (“The 
Myth of the Lehman Sisters”). 
199 See, e.g., Flory et al., supra note 196, at 124, 146.  
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women for reasons that go beyond a taste for competition.200  Some workplaces may 
deliberately manipulate the perception of competitiveness to increase employee 
insecurity and alignment with company objectives; other positions such as those 
involved with commission sales may have long been designed in such terms.201    
Both tend to result in fewer women applying.202  
In short, these “choices” by women not to engage in competition or apply 
for particular jobs are choices made within particular contexts.  Creating bonus 
systems with large wage disparities tends to attract not only those more drawn to 
money, but workers who are less likely to be supportive of colleagues.203  Employers 
who emphasize the competitive nature of such positions can expect to attract more 
men than women, 204 but they are also signaling that they will tolerate certain types 
of behavior that may disadvantage women, such as in-group favoritism or lack of 
mentoring.205  The emphasis on long hours then challenges women who make 
choices under the constraints of familial responsibilities (which in turn become 
employer-enforced stereotypes).206  Moreover, these workplaces will “crowd out” 
values such as concern for others or adherence to ethical principles that many women 
(and men) might prefer.207 
Accordingly, these are choices that are steered by the ways employers 
structure208 and advertise209 jobs, and choices made when women know their actions 
                                                 
200 Danielle Gaucher, Justin Friesen, & Aaron Kay, Evidence that Gendered Wording in Job 
Advertisements Exists and Sustains Gender Inequality, 101 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 109 (July 2011).  
201 EEOC v. Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th 
Cir. 1988). 
202 These studies further indicate that an emphasis on reductionist monetary incentives, as 
opposed to other values such as teamwork or customer satisfaction, are also more likely to 
appeal to men than to women.  See, e.g., Francine Blau & Lawrence Kahn, The Gender Pay 
Gap: Have Women Gone as Far as They Can?, 21 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 7, Table 7 (Feb. 
2007) (finding that men place greater emphasis on money and competition within positions); 
Nicole M. Fortin, The Gender Wage Gap Among Young Adults in the United States; The 
Importance of Money Versus People, 43 J.  HUM. RESOURCES 884 (2008) (indicating that 
men’s greater emphasis on money is a factor exacerbating the wage gap). 
203  Dallas, supra note 121, at 37.  
204 Claire Cain Miller, Job Listings that Are too Feminine for Men,  N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 
2017),  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/upshot/job-disconnect-male-applicants-
feminine-language.html); Emily Peck, High -Paying Job Listings Are Written to Attract Men, 
Study Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/job-
listings-study_us_58c990b7e4b0be71dcf100f7?95yb0fgu253eah5mi&.  
205 Dallas, supra note 121, at 37.  
206 Schoenbaum, supra note 131, at 778 (2013); see also FINE, supra note 24, at 151-72 
207 Stout, supra note 11, at 529 (observing that emphasis on performance pay crowds out 
“concern for others' welfare and for ethical rules, making the assumption of selfish 
opportunism a self-fulfilling prophecy”). 
208 Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1058 
(2015). 
209 Miller, supra note 204. 
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will be viewed differently than men’s.210   The result is a set of cascade effects.  
CEOs may make workplaces more competitive as a way to achieve short-term goals.  
Doing so tends to attract more men than women. The shift in workplace composition 
can then have reinforcing effects, defining the nature of the competition in 
stereotypical male terms and, as we will show below, accurately persuading women 
that they will be less likely to succeed.  
 
2. Selection Effects Part II: The Redefinition of the Company “Man” 
 
The change from career ladders and the “company man” to competitive 
contests involves a shift from technocratic managers to “leaders.”211  A large 
management literature describes the importance of assertive executives, who have 
confidence in their vision for a company, the ability to inspire others, and the 
determination to implement it whatever obstacles get in the way.212  This same 
literature, however, recognizes that leaders who possess such traits are also likely to 
suffer from hubris, lack of empathy, and the willingness to cut corners.213  Indeed, 
Larry Ribstein described the tournament survivors as “Machiavellian, narcissistic, 
prevaricating, pathologically optimistic, free from self-doubt and moral distractions, 
willing to take great risk as the company moves up and to lie when things turn 
                                                 
210 Katie R. Eyer, That's Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2011). 
211  Khurana, supra note 127, at 69. 
212  And the literature describes those most likely to display such traits as narcissists.  See, 
e.g., Michael Maccoby, Narcissistic Leaders: The Incredible Pros, the Inevitable 
Cons, 82 HARV. BUS. REV. 92 (2004) (arguing that narcissism is overall a plus in business 
leadership as it contributes to the ability to “push through massive transformations” and to 
supply the charm necessary to win over the masses): Charles A. O’Reilly III, Bernadette 
Doerr, David F. Caldwell & Jennifer A. Chatman, Narcissistic CEOs and Executive 
Compensation, 25 LEADERSHIP Q. 218, 218 (2013), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2013.08.002 (describing narcissists as more likely to be 
“inspirational, succeed in situations that call for change, and be a force for creativity”). 
213 See, e.g., James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate 
Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 475 (2004) (observing that “U.S. companies place too 
much emphasis on the possession of such traits as optimism and control in top executives, 
when in fact those exhibiting these traits have severe forms of cognitive biases, which are 
disastrous for decision making because they lead individuals to take action uncritically”); 
O’Reilly et al., supra note 189, at 218 (describing narcissistic leaders as “more likely to 
violate integrity standards, have unhappy employees and create destructive workplaces, and 
inhibit the exchange of information within organizations.”); Paredes, supra note 117, at 675 
(describing the hubris of CEOs who see their high pay as an indication of self-worth). 
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bad.”214  Like Ribstein, both management supporters and their critics label this 
collection of traits “narcissistic”215 – and as stereotypically male.216 
What these changes in both finance and upper management do is to place an 
emphasis on stereotypically male leadership traits, defining the ideal traits in 
gendered terms.  The result rewards those perceived to possess such traits and 
minimizes the downside associated with them.217 This creates a set of reinforcing 
effects that aggravates gender disparities. 
First, leadership has been defined in terms of traits such as energy, 
dominance, self-confidence and charisma that are associated with narcissism, and 
narcissists are both more likely to apply for and be selected for such positions. 218  
Second, men are more likely to be identified with such traits.219 
Psychological studies show that while both men and women display such traits, men 
do so to a much greater degree than women.220  Moreover, in looking only at 
narcissists, researchers found that men were more likely than women to desire power 
and to be attracted to positions that promised money, status and authority.  Indeed, 
the single largest gender difference the researchers found was in the willingness to 
demand greater rewards for themselves, and to use greater status to exploit others.221 
                                                 
214 Larry Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2002); see also  O’Reilly et al., supra note 
212, at 218 (noting the increasing evidence that narcissistic individuals often become 
leaders). 
215 See, e.g., Maccoby, supra note 212. 
216 See Emily Grijalva et al., Gender Differences in Narcissism: A Meta-analytic Review, 141 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 261, 264 (Mar 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038231 (summarizing 
the literature). Ann McGinley also emphasizes the normalization of male behavior within the 
workplace that involves “competitive efforts between men to establish superior standing 
and/or resources.”   Ann C. McGinley, !viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious 
Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 441 (2000). 
217 Mary Ann Case emphasizes that this is true even where stereotypically masculine traits 
are associated with worse performance, and greater exposure to liability for the employer. 
Case, supra note 176, at 86.  
218 See, e,g., O’Reilly et al., supra note 191, at 219-20 (indicating that leadership traits, such 
as energy, dominance, self-confidence and charisma, are associated with narcissism and that 
narcissists, especially on first impression, are therefore characterized by others (including 
interviewers, business journalists, and other leaders) as having the requisite characteristics 
to be an effective leader). “In a meta-analysis of 187 studies of individual differences 
proposed to be relevant to effective leadership . . . seven traits were reliably and significantly 
associated with leader effectiveness. . . all of which are characteristics associated with 
narcissism.” Id. at 220. 
219 Grijalva et al., supra note 216, at 262, 280.  
220 Id. Indeed the term “narcissism” is often associated with gender-stereotyped behavior 
such as “physical expressions of anger, a strong need for power, and an 
authoritative leadership style.” ANNIKA LORENZ, ACQUISITION VS. ALLIANCE: THE IMPACT 
OF HUBRIS ON GOVERNANCE CHOICE 25 (2011). 
221 Grijalva found that the largest gender differences involved men’s greater willingness    ”to 
exploit others and to believe that they themselves are special and therefore entitled to 
privileges.” Grijalva et al., supra note 216, at 280.  For examples of the willingness to exploit 
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Third, the selection of top management for their narcissistic qualities is also 
selection for those who will be more inclined to see compensation as a measure of 
merit, to feel that the compensation they received is justified, and to use whatever 
tactics they have at their disposal to increase their leverage in negotiations. 222    A 
study of tech firms found that the more narcissistic CEOs, rated in accordance with 
an employee evaluation of personality traits, received “more total direct 
compensation (salary, bonus, and stock options), have more money in their total 
shareholdings, and have larger discrepancies between their own (higher) 
compensation and the other members of their team.”223  
In short, the selection for narcissistic traits favors men who are more likely 
than women are to desire power, to be attracted to positions that promised money, 
status and authority, to be willing to demand greater rewards for themselves, and to 
use greater status to exploit others. 
 
3. Selection Effect Part III: Gender and “Sharp Elbows”224 
 
While the valorization of narcissistic traits often leads to the willingness to 
overlook many of the negative traits associated with it, women do not benefit to the 
same degree from the expression of these traits nor escape scrutiny to the same 
extent as the men.   At the same time, neither do they receive as much benefit as they 
might otherwise from stereotypically female management traits, which may pay off 
for companies in different – or better – ways. 
The antidiscrimination literature has long shown that women are in a double 
bind with respect to traditionally masculine and aggressive tactics.  If women do 
display “elbows” (as did Ellen Pao), they are judged harshly for not conforming to 
gender stereotypes—but if they do not, they may be viewed as lacking in leadership 
potential.225  The association of the more positive narcissistic traits such as 
                                                 
others, see HILL & PAINTER, supra note 12, at 123-24 (2015) (describing such traits in the 
financial sector). This may go beyond narcissism to psychopathy. Tom Loftus, What Your 
CEO Is Reading: My CEO, My Psychopath; Hwy. 101 Road Rage; Reengineering for Women 
in Tech, Wall St. J. (Mar. 17, 2017), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2017/03/17/what-your-ceo-is-
reading-my-ceo-my-psychopath-hwy-101-road-rage-rengineering-for-women-in-tech/ 
(“Recent studies show that four to eight percent of high-level executives are psychopaths, 
compared to just 1% of the population”). 
222 See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 117, at 675 (describing those who see high rates of 
compensation as indication of professional success or personal self-worth as also likely to 
see the actions that produce the compensation as self-validating.); see also HILL & PAINTER, 
supra note 12, at 116 (describing crowding out effect in bankers). 
223 O’Reilly et al., supra note 189, at 218. 
224 #ambitious #aggressive #pushy #competitive #cutthroat #disregardful #tenacious,”  Sharp 
Elbows, URBAN DICTIONARY (Apr. 5, 2015), 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Sharp%20Elbow. 
225 When women defy gender role expectations, they face numerous repercussions in the 
workplace. Emily A. Leskinen, Verónica Caridad Rabelo, & Lilia M. Cortina, Gender 
Stereotyping and Harassment: A “Catch-22” for Women in the Workplace, 21 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 192 (2015).  See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW 
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“motivation to lead, desire for authority, and self-perceived leadership ability” with 
men tends to reinforce what may be subconscious gender stereotypes.226  At the same 
time, women tend to be criticized for deviation from expected feminine roles even 
when they display the more positive traits227 and punished more severely than men 
for the more negative traits associated with narcissism, such as self-entitlement and 
willingness to exploit others.228  Women at Amazon, for example, attribute the lack 
of a single woman on the company’s top leadership team to its competitive 
evaluation system.  Sounding much like Ellen Pao, they believed that they could lose 
out in promotions because of intangible criteria like the failure to “earn trust” or 
disagreeing with colleagues.229 “Being too forceful, they said, can be particularly 
hazardous for women in the workplace.”230 
This traditional double bind further influences the negotiations that have 
become a much greater factor in determining higher end salaries.  If women fail to 
negotiate or to press hard in negotiations, they fall behind in salaries with potentially 
career long consequences.  At the same time, employers are more likely to view 
women than men negotiating aggressively, especially in negotiations without clear 
                                                 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 68 (2007) 
(women starting to climb the corporate ladder are actually “walking a tightrope” because 
they must be sufficiently aggressive to excel, but not overly aggressive because they will be 
perceived as pushy); Hannah Riley Bowles, et al., Social Incentives for Gender Differences 
in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does Hurt to Ask, 103 ORG. BEHAV. 
HUM. DEC. PROCESSES 84, 95 (2007) (both male and female evaluators penalized women 
who negotiated for more compensation because “they appeared less nice and more 
demanding”). See also the discussion of Ellen Pao’s lawsuit, supra notes 1-3 and 
accompanying text. 
226 For a summary of the literature on the mutually reinforcing effects of such stereotypes, 
see McGinley, supra note 216, at 441 (describing the way men frame women men “as lacking 
legitimacy to hold powerful positions”).   
227 Id. at 436-39 (describing how women are treated more negatively when they demonstrate 
leadership skills). 
228 See Grijalva, et al., supra note 216, at 264. McGinley also emphasizes the normalization 
of male behavior within the workplace that involves “competitive efforts between men to 
establish superior standing and/or resources.”  These behaviors include vying for attention, 
self-promotion, efforts to control or dominate others, and taking credit for the work of others.  
McGinley, supra note 216, at 441. 
229 Indeed, Dallas, supra note 121, at 36-37, observes that competitive evaluation systems  
create incentives to undermine employees perceived as untrustworthy. 
230 Jodi Kantor & David Streitfeld,   Inside Amazon: Wrestling Big Ideas in a Bruising 
Workplace, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/technology/inside-amazon-wrestling-big-ideas-in-a-
bruising-workplace.html. 
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standards for the results.231  And even if they do negotiate at the same rate as men, 
they are less likely to receive promotions.232 
In industries that reward taking risks by breaking the rules and hoping to get 
away with it, the double bind may be particularly pernicious.  A study of the financial 
industry demonstrates, for example, that misconduct is prevalent: “roughly one in 
thirteen financial advisers in the U.S. has a record of misconduct.”233  Gender 
differences in the misconduct are rife.  Men are three times as likely to engage in 
misconduct, twice as likely to be repeat offenders, and commit offenses that turn out 
to be 20% costlier to their employers.234  Yet, once misconduct is reported, the 
women are 20% more likely to lose their jobs and 30% less likely to find new ones 
compared to the men.235 These patterns correspond with the representation of 
women in senior management; “firms in which males comprise a greater percentage 
of executives/owners are more likely to punish female advisers more severely and 
hire fewer females with a record of past misconduct.”236  In an industry in which 
misconduct charges are frequent and risk-taking includes a willingness to break the 
rules, the stakes for women in getting caught are substantially greater.237  
Given these practices, it is hardly surprising that fewer women apply to these 
positions.  What some men may perceive as an opportunity to thrive in a competitive 
environment, many women may see a “heads I win, tails you lose game” in which 
                                                 
231 See e.g., Benjamin Artz et al., Do Women Ask? (Sept. 2016), 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2016/twerp_1127_
oswald.pdf; Blau & Kahn, supra note 90, at 37 (summarizing gender differences in 
negotiation); Laura Cohn, Women Ask for Raises as Much as Men, but Get Them Less Often, 
Fortune (Sept. 6, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/06/women-men-salary-negotiations/ 
(study of Australian workplaces found that women asked for pay raises as often as men, but 
were less likely to receive them). 
232 Artz et al., supra note 231; Daniel Victor, Research Suggests Women Are Asking for 
Raises, but Men Get Them More, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/business/research-suggests-women-are-asking-for-
raises-but-men-get-them-more.html?_r=0.  
233 Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos, & Amit Seru, When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard 
in Punishing Misconduct 2 (Mar. 12, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2931940 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2931940. 
234 Id. at 3. 
235 Id. at 12-14, 30.  The study observes further that part of the reason for the discrepancy is 
the sources of the complaints.  For the men, customers initiate 55% of the misconduct 
complaints compared to 28% by their employers. For the women, employer-initiated 
instances of misconduct are almost as common as customer-initiated complaints (41% versus 
44%).  Id. at 4.  These findings are consistent with the study’s finding that firms with more 
women owners and managers reduce the gender disparities. 
236 Id. at 30. 
237 Ben Steverman, Proof Wall Street Is Still a Boys’ Club: Financial Advisory Firms Are 
Far More Lenient with Men Who Break the Rules, a New Study Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 
2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-14/proof-wall-street-is-still-a-
boys-club. 
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they may be less likely to enjoy the benefits of outsized risks, but more likely to 
experience their negative consequences.238   
  
 
* * * 
 
Large companies today rely heavily today on pay for performance systems, 
with competitive evaluations that rank employees.239  Managers often introduce such 
systems to shake up an organization, reorient it toward new management objectives, 
or prepare for layoffs.240  The systems, even when they strive to be objective, are 
subject to favoritism and gamesmanship.241    Such workplaces encourage “unethical 
behavior, since some individuals are willing to pay to improve their rank by 
sabotaging others’ work or by increasing artificially their own relative 
performance.”242 And there is no evidence they improve performance.  Yet, they 
remain entrenched partly because competition, rankings and bonuses have become 
associated with standard management norms and are self-reinforcing while 
entrenching double-bind detriments243 and partly because they do deliver short term 
                                                 
238 These practices involve huge risks of a predictable nature.  See, e.g., William W. 
Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1360 (2002) 
(describing Enron’s pressure to maximize shareholder value and a culture of winning 
creating an environment that encourages “risk-prone decision making”).  
239 Enron, for example, used the “rank and yank” performance management system initially 
developed at GE to rank their employees and then terminate the bottom 10%. This created 
an uncomfortably competitive corporate ethos that made workers rationalize their illegal 
conduct as successful business practices. See, e.g., PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER, 
WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON 51-52 (2002); see also Nancy B. Rapoport, “Nudging” 
Better Lawyer Behavior: Using Default Rules and Incentives to Change Behavior in Law 
Firms, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 42, 42 n.2 (2014) (“Want people to turn on 
their colleagues rather than encourage teamwork? Use a ‘rank and yank’ system that 
routinely drops the bottom 10% of high achievers off the payroll”). 
240Steve Bates, Forced Rankling, HR MAG. (June 1, 2003), https://www.shrm.org/hr-
today/news/hr-magazine/pages/0603bates.aspx. 
241 Id. 
242 Gary Charness, David Masclet, & Marie Claire Villeval, The Dark Side of Competition 
for Status, 60 MGMT. SCI. 38, 42 (2014). 
243 See, e.g., Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999) 
(observing that “(ostensibly) independent decisions, might repeatedly ignore their own 
inclinations, preferring instead to emulate their predecessors.  More specifically, the cascades 
literature posits that strategic actors may rationally prefer emulation, presuming (frequently 
incorrectly) that their own information is unreliable measured against the stock of that 
revealed from their predecessors' actions.”)  For an example of this in the sex stereotyping 
literature, see Case, supra note 204, at 86-7,  describing the report of a commission 
examining police practices:  
 
The Commission reported that while female officers' greater tendency to 
manifest feminine and avoid masculine behaviors actually caused them to 
outperform male officers, the stereotypical expectation of male officers 
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pay-offs to ambitious CEOs.244  Even if a growing literature documents the long 
term disadvantages of these practices, companies focused on the short terms may 
have little incentive to change. 
At the same time, the emphasis on individual rather than institutional 
advancement often crowds out other values245 and undermines the importance of 
what women do well.  Stereotypically female leadership styles are more associated 
with transformational approaches that take group cohesion into account rather than 
transactional approaches that focus only on the bottom line, and the management 
literature finds that such leadership delivers more successful results.246  Yet, these 
qualities are less rewarded in the competitive environments such as those in tech and 
finance that offer the highest rates of compensation. 
Further compounding these results is the fact that women are often less 
geographically mobile then men, and thus more likely to invest in job specific traits 
rather than preparation for the next move.247  Yet, modern workplaces, with their 
emphasis on landing rising stars rather than on investing in their own, provide 
                                                 
that policing called for masculine traits and that female officers lacked 
these traits caused male officers systematically to underrate the female 
officers' performance.  
244 Dallas, supra note 121, at 37, n.222 (noting tradeoffs between short-term objectives and 
long term effects). 
245 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 12, at 116.  Studies of bankers, who are part of an industry 
associated with money, indicate that their identity as bankers make them more likely to cheat 
in laboratory experiments. Id.  at 115. Women, in contrast, tend to be generally less tolerant 
of illegal or unethical behavior, though woman managers in institutions in which such 
behavior is normalized exhibit fewer differences than other workers. See ALICE 
HENDRICKSON EAGLY & LINDA LORENE CARLI, THROUGH THE LABYRINTH: THE TRUTH 
ABOUT HOW WOMEN BECOME LEADERS 46(2014) (indicating that women are less tolerant 
than men of unscrupulous negotiating tactics such as misrepresenting facts, or promising 
something without planning to keep the promise).   
246 See Alice H. Eagly, Women as Leaders: Leadership Style vs. Leaders’ Values and 
Attitudes, Harvard Business School Research Symposium, Gender & Work: Challenging 
Conventional Wisdom (2013), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/conferences/2013-w50-research-
symposium/Documents/eagly.pdf; Alice Eagly et al., Do Women Make Better Bosses? N.Y. 
TIMES . (Aug. 2, 2009),http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/do-women-
make-better-bosses/?_r=0#alice;  Claire Shipman & Katty Kay, Women Will Rule Business, 
TIME (May 14, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1898024_1898023_189807
8,00.html. 
247 See, e.g., Karen S. Lyness & Donna E. Thompson, Climbing the Corporate Ladder: Do 
Female and Male Executives Follow the Same Route?, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 86 (2000); 
Audrey J. Murrell, Irene Hanson Frieze, & Josephine E. Olson, Mobility Strategies and 
Career Outcomes: A Longitudinal Study of MBAs, 49 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 324, 324-25 
(1996). 
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greater rewards for those willing to move, both within institutions and to new 
positions elsewhere.248  
 Overall, these shifts in corporate culture have deeply gendered effects.249   
Qualities such as the emphasis on competition rather than cooperation, individual 
rather than group interests, and short-term rather than longer term or more holistic 
aims correspond to well-documented gender disparities.250  The more sophisticated 
studies show that the disparities tend to be less about capacity and performance, and 
more about stereotypical assumptions about leadership.251   The “tournament” tends 
to attract those most “willing to take great risk as the company moves up and to lie 
when things turn bad.”252    The fact that the characteristics associated with these 
positions tend to be gendered ones further encourages stereotyped evaluations of 
employee performance,253 with reinforcing effects as women become even less 
likely to apply or to succeed if they are hired. 
 
 Antidiscrimination law, in its current incarnation, is ill-equipped to deal 
with these background business incentives that promote inequality.   
 
III. RESTRUCTURING ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW  
  
                                                 
248 Flory, et al., supra note 196, at 154-55, note for example that, even in low level positions, 
the great majority of workers receive evaluations and may be able to apply for promotions 
or moves within an organization that depend on these evaluations.   
249 See supra notes 171-253 and accompanying text. 
250 See, e.g., supra note 246 discussion of transformative v. transactional leadership styles. 
251 Managers with a more stereotypically female approach, whether they are men or women, 
often do better than the narcissists.  See Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Why Do So Many 
Incompetent Men Become Leaders?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 22, 2013), 
https://hbr.org/2013/08/why-do-so-many-incompetent-men (summarizing research 
literature on gender differences in selection and performance). 
252 Ribstein, supra note 9, at 9. 
253 See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 68 (2007) (women starting to climb the 
corporate ladder are actually “walking a tightrope” because they must be sufficiently 
aggressive to excel, but not overly aggressive because they will be perceived as pushy); 
Hannah Riley Bowles et al., Social Incentives for Gender Differences in the Propensity to 
Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does Hurt to Ask, 103 ORG. BEHAV. HUM. DEC. 
PROCESSES 84, 95 (2007) (if the evaluator was female, women were not less included to 
negotiate; however, both male and female evaluators penalized women who negotiated for 
more compensation because “they appeared less nice and more demanding”). See also Ben 
DiPietro, Survey Roundup: Women Take Step Back in Board Representation, WALL ST. J. 
(June 23, 2017), https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2017/06/23/survey-roundup-
women-take-step-back-in-board-representation/. (“A report from executive search firm 
Heidrick & Struggles found28% of board seat appointments at Fortune 500 companies in 
2016 went to women, down from 30% in 2015”). 
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 The history of antidiscrimination law shows that it sought to combat not just 
individual instances of discrimination, but structural factors that had created white-
male-only “good” jobs and segregated “bad” jobs dominated by African-Americans, 
women, or other minorities.  In doing so, antidiscrimination law both depended on 
earlier equality enhancing measures, such as unionization,254 and focused new 
scrutiny on other practices, such as sexual harassment or qualification tests that had 
been previously treated as routine workplace practices.  In many cases, the practices, 
which were initially viewed as routine, became hard to justify once subject to 
scrutiny that showed both disparate impact on the basis of factors such as race and 
gender and the lack of workplace justifications.   
 In today’s economy, courts have similarly viewed the shift toward winner-
take-all compensation systems and the negative-sum competitive mindset in 
management and finance as routine and outside the appropriate ambit of judicial 
scrutiny in antidiscrimination suits.  So long as they do, individual cases like Ellen 
Pao’s cannot address the systemic factors that underlie such cases; her case simply 
amounts to a claim that Kleiner-Perkins should welcome women with sharp elbows 
alongside the men.255 
 This section looks at the ability of antidiscrimination to address the systemic 
practices.  First, it shows how existing disparate treatment law is ill-suited to address 
the interconnections between individual employee evaluations and the shift in 
business cultures.  Second, it considers the degree to which cases like Microsoft, that 
use discrimination law to challenge the practices themselves, can be more effective.   
 This section concludes that where companies adopt competitive evaluation 
schemes associated with increased executive compensation and gender disparities, 
and where these systems do not correspond to evidence of increased firm 
performance, such practices should be subject to greater judicial scrutiny.  The form 
that scrutiny takes will depend on the nature of the individual case, but it will only 
fit into Title VII through an approach that engages the substantive legitimacy of the 
practices.  The conclusion suggests that the most effective approaches, however, 
combine antidiscrimination efforts with substantive reforms designed to address the 
practices.  
  
A. The Limited Reach of Current Antidiscrimination Doctrine 
 
Anti-discrimination scholars correctly observe that the law has failed  to 
keep up as workforces have changed from narrow portals of entry and lockstep 
career ladders to easier entry into unskilled positions and more subjective and 
                                                 
254 See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 13-24 (2016) (documenting the 
decline in union strength). 
255 Nitasha Tiku, Five Uncomfortable Truths About the Ellen Pao Verdict, VERGE (Apr. 2, 
2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/4/2/8328115/ellen-pao-kleiner-perkins-venture-
capital-verdict. 
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individualized pathways to advancement.256  As these theorists argue, proving that 
an employer has treated an individual employee unfairly because of sex 
discrimination has become increasingly difficult.257  
Ellen Pao’s case provides an example of the limitations of Title VII as a 
check on the determinations made within such as a system when the case is framed 
solely as one of unequal treatment of an individual woman in accordance with the 
ordinary norms of a competitive workplace.258  Her case generated attention to the 
lack of women in venture capital firms, but Pao’s lawsuit took the Kleiner Perkins 
evaluation system as a given and argued that she was unfairly evaluated in 
accordance with it.  This type of case poses intrinsic limitations:  such individual 
cases do not fundamentally challenge the nature of the competition that underlies 
the system.   
Some scholars argue that Title VII was never intended to deal with either 
the type of evaluation system a firm uses or the business decisions made under 
them.259  A principal part of Pao’s case, for example, involved the firm’s decision 
not to sponsor her proposed investment in Twitter in 2007, at the very beginning of 
the social media era.  Kleiner Perkins showed interest in Twitter only when a male 
employee proposed it in 2010, well after other venture capital firms had gotten in on 
the early funding rounds.260   Yet, relying on hindsight to show that a firm passed up 
what turned out to be an incredibly lucrative investment because of gender bias is 
intrinsically difficult. 
 Moreover, disparate treatment is hard to prove without a comparator, and 
exact comparators are hard to find in individual cases.  The prima facie case model 
for contemporary antidiscrimination law relies principally on comparison evidence 
demonstrating that an employer treated a plaintiff less favorably than a similar 
                                                 
256 See, e.g., Green, supra  note 39, at 100 (noting change in the years after Title VII away 
from the “well-defined, hierarchical, bureaucratic structures delineating clear paths for 
advancement within institutions” that characterized workplaces at the beginning of the 
antidiscrimination efforts.); Sturm, supra  note 17, at 469 (observing that “[e]xclusion 
increasingly results not from an intentional effort formally to exclude, but rather as a 
byproduct of ongoing interactions shaped by the structures of day-to-day decisionmaking 
and workplace relationships”).   
257 Sturm, supra note 17, at 468-69; see also Selmi, supra note 67, at 780 (pointing out the 
difficulty in remedying subtle forms of discrimination). 
258 Indeed, the New York Times referred to Kleiner Perkins, one of Silicon Valley’s premier 
venture capital firms as “one of those clans where everyone is fighting for power and wealth.” 
David Streitfeld,  Kleiner Perkins Portrays Ellen Pao as Combative and Resentful in Sex 
Bias Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/technology/kleiner-perkins-portrays-ellen-pao-as-
combative-and-resentful-in-sex-bias-
trial.html?action=click&contentCollection=Technology&module=RelatedCoverage&regio
n=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article. 
259 Bagenstos, supra note 17, at 8 (discussing how “it may be difficult, if not impossible, for 
a court to go back and reconstruct the numerous biased evaluations and perceptions that 
ultimately resulted in an adverse employment decision”).  
260 Tiku, supra note 255.  
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worker from a different group, because of a protected characteristic.261    Among top 
level and professional jobs, there may simply be no one else in a small unit.262   Even 
among middle management positions there may be no one who performs the same 
duties.263  In an Equal Pay Act case, a federal trial court observed that: 
 
These are Senior Vice Presidents in charge of different aspects of 
Defendant's operations; these are not assembly-line workers or 
customer-service representatives. In the case of such lower-level 
workers, the goals of the Equal Pay Act can be accomplished due to 
the fact that these types of workers perform commodity-like work 
and, therefore, should be paid commodity-like salaries. However, 
the practical realities of hiring and compensating high-level 
executives deal a fatal blow to Equal Pay Act claims.264  
Moreover, in today’s workplaces, routine duties have become increasingly 
mechanized or outsourced, with the remaining employees performing varied and 
discretionary tasks.265   
In Pao’s case, she complained that her compensation was low because of 
her failure to be promoted, the way the firm allocated carried interest from its 
                                                 
261 See supra discussion in text at notes 58-66; Franklin, supra note 46, at 1317, 1367; Naomi 
Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry in Antidiscrimination Law, __ WIS. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2017).  
262 Morgan v. Cty. Comm'n of Lawrence Cty., No. 5:14-CV-01823-CLS, 2016 WL 3525357, 
at *6 (N.D. Ala. June 20, 2016) (emergency management agency director; the “agency was 
staffed by three persons, holding the positions of Director, Deputy Director, and TVA 
Planner”); Sally E. Anderson, Special Considerations for Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/lpl/downloads/soleandsmallfirm.pdf (last visited July 
9, 2016) (“nearly 80 percent of lawyers in the United States currently practice in firms of this 
size [one to five lawyers]”).  
263 See, e.g., Bilow v. Much Shelist Freed Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, P.C.,  277 F.3d 
882, 894 (7th Cir. 2001) (a female attorney who sued her firm for failing to provide adequate 
staffing on her cases was unable to find similar cases in which male attorneys had received 
better staffing.  The court found that the cases she identified for comparison “on which male 
attorneys seemingly received more assistance were cases that were either more complex, or 
were not contingent fee cases, or took place in Chicago and therefore did not entail the same 
travel expenses.”); Byrd v. Ronayne, 61 F.3d 1026, 1032 n.7. (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that 
the plaintiff was unable to find an apt comparator because she had “not shown that any other 
associate—male or female—who failed to conform with the firm’s professional standards, 
had ever been considered for partnership.”) 
264 Georgen-Saad v. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 195 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857 (W.D. Tex. 2002); see also 
Keener v. Universal Cos., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 902, 907 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (plaintiff who 
was a shipping and receiving clerk complained that she had to perform some of the job duties 
of a shipping and receiving supervisors, but could not identify a comparator); Eisenberg, 
supra note 14, at 40.  
265 Goldberg, supra note 60, 755-56 (describing the prevalence of assembly line workplaces 
in the manufacturing era in comparison with today’s more varied assignment of 
responsibilities). 
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investment fund, and the failure to fully compensate her for the value she 
delivered.266  Kleiner-Perkins responded that Pao was “treated better than her alleged 
male peers and was in fact paid more during key period at issue.”267  Pao’s 
allegations, however, ultimately depended, not a snapshot of compensation with 
male peers at a particular point in time, but rather on the cumulative effect of a series 
of subjective decisions. 
In addition, while stereotyping goes to the heart of Pao’s claims, the way 
the law on gender stereotyping discrimination has developed makes claims of 
unconscious, subjective, or cumulative bias difficult to prove.268  In the original U.S. 
Supreme Court case on stereotyping, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,269 the plaintiff, 
Ann Hopkins was a candidate for partnership at an accounting giant, and she had an 
outstanding record of obtaining major contracts. In denying her partnership, the 
partners’ criticism of her included that she cursed, could use a “course at charm 
school,” and that if she wanted to make partner at later time, she should “walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her 
hair styled, and wear jewelry.”270  The Supreme Court observed that “it takes no 
special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female 
employee as requiring ‘a course in charm school.’”271 The Court separated language 
that it deemed gender stereotyping—such as terms like “macho” and “masculine,” 
from language it perceived as gender neutral, but an unfavorable evaluation of her—
that she was “overly aggressive” and “unduly harsh.”272   
Yet, since 1989, employers have become more adept at avoiding references 
to “charm school” and other explicitly gendered comments.273  Instead, sex 
                                                 
266 Complaint, Paragraphs, 24-26, 
file:///C:/Users/jcarbone/Downloads/org.sfsuperiorcourt.CGC12520719.79.0.pdf 
267 Trial Brief of Defendant Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers LLC, Superior Court of 
California, County of San Francisco Case No. CGC 12 520719 Ellen Pao v. Kleiner Perkins 
Caufield & Byers LLC et al., 
file:///C:/Users/jcarbone/Downloads/org.sfsuperiorcourt.CGC12520719.196.0%20(1).pdf, 
at 10.  
268 Charlotte S. Alexander et al., Post-Racial Hydraulics: The Hidden Dangers of the 
Universal Turn, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 43 (2016) (“because most Americans embrace equality 
ideals, they discriminate in subtle, obfuscated, and sometimes unconscious ways”); Sturm, 
supra note 17, at 460 (“Cognitive bias, structures of decisionmaking, and patterns of 
interaction have replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of much continued 
inequality”). 
269 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
270 Id. at 235. 
271 Id. at 256. 
272 Id. at 235. 
273 In the Pao case, formal performance reviews did not contain such language, but testimony 
at trial indicated that one partner told an investigator that Pao had a “female chip on her 
shoulder,” while another partner said “women should not be invited to a dinner with former 
Vice President Al Gore because they ‘“kill the buzz’”; another partner “joked to a junior 
partner that she should be ‘flattered’ that a colleague showed up at her hotel room door 
wearing only a bathrobe.” David Streitfeld, Ellen Pao Loses Silicon Valley Bias Case Against 
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stereotyping more typically involves unconscious biases that may “sneak up” on a 
decisionmaker. Biases “affect perceptions and evaluations of an employee in 
innumerable encounters that occur well before any ultimate moment of work-
assignment, promotion, or discharge decision. By the time the manager actually 
makes such a decision, the die may have already been cast by the earlier biased 
perceptions.”274   
Pao’s claims follow the classic scenario: she alleged that the firm 
discriminated against her through a series of actions that had a cumulative effect,275 
while the jurors ultimately held against her the fact that her performance reviews 
deteriorated over time, so that her termination came as the end result of a long period 
of difficulties.276   
Kleiner Perkins effectively used those evaluations against Pao because they 
established that she had been on notice of the firm’s concerns about her performance 
and failed to make the necessary adjustments.  The evaluations referred to “pushing 
too hard to establish herself, rather than being collaborative,”277 being too territorial 
and untrustworthy, pursuing her own agenda, and not being “a team player.”278   A 
central part of Pao’s response, however, was that such behavior was typical and 
tolerated by male employees, and that some of the perception that she was not a team 
player came from her complaints about the firm’s hostile atmosphere for women.  
Indeed, one of the jurors most favorable to Pao, who believed that she had been the 
victim of discrimination, commented that the male junior partners at Kleiner “had 
those same character flaws that Ellen was cited with,” but they were promoted 
anyway.279   In short, Pao’s claim was that she could not get away with the same 
self-interested, competitive behavior as the men. 
Competitive workplaces intrinsically involve a balance between self-
promotion that benefits the company (how many top clients did Pao land?) and 
competitive characteristics that alienate others (Pao’s purported “sharp elbows”).  
Indeed, Liars’ Poker described investment banking houses as celebrating traders’ 
ability to lie – and get away with it.  Pao’s claim, presented as an individual case, 
amounted to an assertion that Kleiner Perkins got the balance wrong.  Yet, her case 
attracted attention because it symbolized the limited presence of women in the 
venture capital world.   In the context of such a case, Pao, who very much wanted to 
be in that world, could not truly represent the women who never applied because 
they found the entire environment hostile.  Nor could Pao present what may be well 
                                                 
Kleiner Perkins, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2015), 
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274 Bagenstos, supra note 17, at 8.  
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277 Trial Brief, supra note 267, at 3. 
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be the most compelling claim against such a system – the claim that the system itself 
is intrinsically flawed.  The next section will explain how antidiscrimination cases 
can combine challenges to the legitimacy of competitive management systems with 
claims of disparate gender impact, and how they can enhance the impact of 
antidiscrimination law in the process.  
 
B.  Antidiscrimination Law and a Structural Equality Approach 
  
As we discussed above, Congress initially adopted Title VII to eliminate 
discriminatory employment practices based on a structural analysis that identified 
segregated workplaces not only as a source of racial and gender inequality bus also 
as an impediment to economic growth.  Antidiscrimination law has stalled in the 
new era because it is not tied to a comparable structural analysis of the new sources 
of inequality and a commitment to evaluate them on their own terms.  Consequently, 
antidiscrimination law has been unable to address the promotion processes that 
determine the benefits of the new economy.    
This section argues that reaching these gendered business practices requires 
a new approach: substantively engaging the propriety of the practices and linking 
them to counterproductive workplaces practices and gender disparities.  The 
immediate impact of doing so sets up disparate impact cases such as the one against 
Microsoft. But the longer-term effect of such an approach, as with the 
delegitimization of segregated workplaces, may be greater judicial willingness to 
extend existing legal doctrines to reach such practices.   
The section frames the analysis of how to move forward by parsing the 
elements of disparate impact, first, showing the disparate impact associated with 
these business practices.  Then, in anticipation of a corporation’s defense, this 
section demonstrates that these practices cannot be justified by business necessity 
because a wealth of business literature shows that the practices have detrimental 
effects on companies and their employees. As for the third element of a disparate 
income case, the section shows that less discriminatory alternatives exist, and they 
are ones that comparably serve employers’ purposes.   
To prove a disparate impact claim, plaintiffs must show that an employer 
uses a particular employment practice that has an adverse impact on women.280  
Courts have adopted the EEOC test for what constitutes a “sufficiently substantial” 
disparity: when the selection rate for one group is less than 80% of the selection rate 
for another group.281  While the employer may argue that the statistical analysis must 
trace to the specific employment practice, plaintiffs can use bottom line statistics—
the end results of hiring or promotional practices—if “the elements of a respondent’s 
                                                 
280 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658 
(1989);  see Sandra F. Sperino, Justice Kennedy's Big New Idea, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1789, 
1795-96 (2016)(discussing elements of a disparate impact claim).. 
281 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (2010); see Elliot Ko, Note, Big Enough to Matter: Whether Statistical 
Significance or Practical Significance Should Be the Test for Title VII Disparate Impact 
Claims, 101 MINN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2016) (discussing this test). 
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decision-making process are not capable of separation for analysis.”282  Once the 
plaintiff shows disparate impact, the employer can satisfy its burden by showing a 
business necessity, “an overriding legitimate, non-[gender-based] business 
purpose.”283  The plaintiffs can still succeed if they prove that the employer could 
have adopted an alternative practices that would comparably serve the employer’s 
purposes but not result in the same gender disparities.284 
The conventional practices challenged in disparate impact litigation have 
been things like background checks, height and weight requirements, or pencil and 
paper tests.285  Importantly, there is no legal requirement that disparate impact 
analysis apply only to formal or written policies; a subjective form of assessment 
can be considered a particular employment practice.286 Yet, until this Article, 
completely missing from the discrimination literature is whether the traits that form 
the basis for selection can themselves be the basis for disparate impact litigation. 
The competitive promotional practices we are discussing have been under 
the radar because they simply look like background business decisions.   In an early 
comparable worth case, American Federation of State, County, & Municipal 
Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) v. Washington, brought as a disparate impact 
claim, the plaintiffs had difficulty challenging an entire state-selected system of 
compensation based on the market structure.287 Yet, these challenges to forced 
competition and artificial stacking practices are different from assailing market 
structures.288  Within companies, managers are making intentional decisions to 
implement appraisal systems that value competition and that have a disparate impact 
on women.289   
Seniors have filed and settled several class action lawsuits against major 
corporations, such as Ford and Goodyear, arguing that forced ranking systems were 
simply disguises for purposeful age-based discrimination.290 In the case against 
                                                 
282 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). 
283 United States v. Papermakers, 416 F.2d 980, 989 (5th Cir. 1969).  This is the paradigmatic 
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284 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); Sperino, supra note 280, at 1830. 
285 Dothard, 433 U.S. 321; EEOC v. Freeman, 778 F. 3d 463 (4th Cir. 2015); Briscoe v. City 
of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200, 205-09 (2d Cir. 2011). 
286 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988). 
287 770 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A compensation system that is responsive to supply 
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employment policy contemplated by Dothard and Griggs; such a compensation system . . . 
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288 Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to 
Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951 (2011). 
289 See, e.g., Marta M. Elvira & Mary E. Graham, Not Just a Formality: Pay System 
Formalization and Sex-Related Earnings Effects, 13 ORGANIZATION SCI. 601 (2002) (finding 
that bonus pay systems produce more gender disparities than systems that give greater weight 
to base pay). 
290 See, e.g., Write Them up and Get Them out: Age Discrimination Through Forced Ranking 
Systems, 2 ANN. 2004 ATLA –CLE 1794 (July 2004).  
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Ford, the plaintiffs showed that older workers were so disproportionately placed in 
the lowest category that Ford faced an “almost impossible burden in showing” that 
the forced ranking “was job-related and consistent with business necessity.”291   
The systems of negative sum competition, such as stack ranking or rank-
and-yank, can be shown to have a disparate impact on vulnerable groups. 292 In a 
Monte Carlo style simulation study with organizations of various sizes, researchers 
determined that a forced ranking system selecting for termination would have 
racially disparate effects. In a small organization, if 10% of the workforce were laid 
off, the chance of a disparate impact violation would be 5.1%, “and this increases to 
an 11.8% likelihood of an [adverse impact] flag when 15% of the workforce is laid 
off.”293 In addition, a forced ranking system insulates subjective reasons for an 
assessment behind the cloak of a numerical value, and the system itself may be used 
when there are an insufficient number of employees to make curving process 
valid.294  While few comprehensive studies have been undertaken, evidence is 
emerging that rank-and-yank methods have gendered effects.  For example, in the 
information technology industry, a 2016 study shows that the largest factor 
correlating with gaps in women’s duration of work in the IT industry was whether a 
firm used “rank and yank” methods.295 
If employers seek to justify such systems as a business necessity, they 
should find it difficult. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 puts the burden of proof on the 
employer to establish this defense by showing that the challenged practice is job 
related and “consistent with business necessity.296 In the original disparate impact 
case of Griggs v. Duke Power,297, for example, the Supreme Court held that the 
requirement of a high school diploma was not “significantly related to successful 
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job performance” for blue collar workers at a power-generating facility.298   The 
EEOC has recently developed a new guidance to more strongly interrogate blanket 
refusals to hire people with any criminal background.299  
By contrast, the negative sum management strategies have been treated as 
neutral.  When female and African American plaintiffs in a 2001 case against 
Microsoft, Donaldson v. Microsoft, challenged its forced ranking system, the court 
denied class certification, finding that the results of an individualized rating system 
meant that the class claims were not common.300  The court also dismissed the 
disparate impact claims in that suit, finding an absence of statistical evidence 
supporting the plaintiffs’ theories.  In this earlier Microsoft case, the plaintiffs 
simply were not able to show disparities in compensation or promotion decisions 
regarding putative class members.301 Yet, in part, the court prevented that 
demonstration by accepting Microsoft’s claim that its assessment system was a 
“meritocracy” akin to a grading curve,302 and denying the plaintiffs the ability to 
aggregate their numbers in a class action to supply precisely the proof that the court 
said was missing.  It does not appear that the Donaldson plaintiffs challenged the 
competition itself as a gendered metric of evaluation. 
Almost fifteen years later, in Moussouris v. Microsoft, the court was initially 
dismissive of similar claims, holding that the plaintiffs did not explain why a forced 
curve would systematically undervalue women in the tech professions.303  Yet, the 
court allowed the case to proceed after the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint 
targeting the stack ranking system Microsoft used between 2011 and 2013 as an 
invalid performance instrument that has gendered effects.304  The amended pleading 
points out that 80% of the managers who were calibrating their employees’ 
performance were men, while only 17% of the tech employees whose performances 
were being rated were women, and the amended complaint detailed the system’s 
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gender-based pay and promotion effects.305  In October of 2016, the court denied 
Microsoft’s second motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs had identified a 
specific employment practice—the stack ranking system—that had a disparate 
impact on female tech workers.   
Microsoft will presumably claim that the system can be justified as a 
“business necessity.”306  The Microsoft environment, however, does not seem 
conducive to improving economic performance.307 Indeed, Vanity Fair, commenting 
on Microsoft’s use of the system challenged in the litigation described above, 
observed that: “Potential market-busting businesses—such as e-book and 
smartphone technology—were killed, derailed, or delayed amid bickering and 
power plays.”308  
As the management literature indicates, these ultra-competitive 
management systems are bad business practices.309  And even where these practices 
may have some effectiveness in selecting lower-performing workers for termination 
in the first year or two, the reliability and validity effects diminish very sharply over 
time.310  Moreover, investors and shareholders are beginning to understand the 
shortcomings of negative sum competitions, which are often tied to short-term 
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measures of business performance.311 Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, the 
world’s largest global investment management company, wrote a letter to the CEOs 
of other leading companies urging a move away from practices that have led to the 
maximization of short term profits at the expense of the long term health of 
businesses.312  And studies repeatedly show that employers can adopt a less 
discriminatory alternative that could achieve their purposes.313  Management experts 
have identified numerous alternative systems that could serve employer goals of 
effective employee performance in a comparably effective manner to the challenged 
practices.  For example, employers could set achievement goals and role-specific 
strategies, provide more immediate feedback, both positive and negative, to enhance 
project performance, and create action plans rather than move to immediate 
termination.314 In short, these management practices that are associated with gender 
disparities are also bad for business, and, consequently, they are – or should be315 – 
indefensible under Title VII. 
 
* * * * 
 
Disparate impact theory has been limited in its effectiveness, for the reasons 
indicated in Section I. That is, the suits have been effective where tied to a 
determination to root out a discredited practice and ineffective where they seek to 
extend Title VII without a substantive analysis that links particular practices not just 
to disparate impact per se but to systemic practices that deserve scrutiny.316 
 
A victory for the Microsoft plaintiffs is therefore likely to encourage 
technical evasions. It is difficult to obtain statistical evidence necessary to prove a 
disparate impact violation, and companies can ensure that rank and yank evaluations 
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do not cross the disparate impact threshold.317  Alternatively, employers can 
eliminate the “yank” part of rank and yank while otherwise keeping competitive 
rankings.  While courts should find it difficult to hold that a discredited practice 
meets the business necessity defense, defendants can, nonetheless, more easily 
defend a newly reconfigured practice that lacks, at least for the time being, the same 
degree of notoriety or established negative effects.318 Nonetheless, this article 
suggests that the practices that emphasize destructive competition over collaboration 
(or other forms of competition), when they influence recruitment practices, 
evaluation and promotion measures, or termination procedures, can be expected to 
produce similar gender disparities, and like “rank and yank,” they too should be 
illegal absent a demonstration of business necessity.  Of course, simply emphasizing 
competition does not always produce such disparities, nor is it always unjustified.319   
It is the illegitimacy of the underlying practice, coupled with the statistically 
disparate gender effects, that creates the systemic challenge.  
For this approach suggested in this Article to be effective, therefore, requires 
not just focus on rank and yank, but a broader inquiry into the sources of greater 
inequality. A true structural analysis must simultaneously engage gender disparities 
and economic inequality.  Consequently, this transformative use of 
antidiscrimination law is not just an extension of existing law, but is fundamentally 
different in conception from earlier assumptions about Title VII. The analysis goes 
to the heart of what are, at once, metrics that produce gender inequalities and that 
are also indefensible as appropriate business practices. Indeed, at times, innovations 
in governing law prompt social and educational changes much larger than their 
doctrinal effects.320  Regardless of whether disparate impact succeeds in any 
individual case, it provides a basis for reviving the vision of antidiscrimination law 
as promoting equality both within and outside of the workplace, as challenging 
prohibited classifications and systemic economic inequality. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The management revolution that greatly increased executive compensation 
(and overall societal inequality), contributed to the financialization of American 
business, and dramatically worsened gender disparities at the top of the American 
income ladder has been the subject of increasing criticism321  New studies 
demonstrate that companies that have adopted the more competitive and share-
focused corporate culture have performed worse than the supposed bureaucratic 
business entities of mid-century America.322 
 Once these practices take hold, they do not stop with slowing growth or 
counterproductive business models.  They also have reinforcing sets of effects on 
who gains power, how they conduct business, and the consequences for society a 
whole.  As this article demonstrates, the focus on outsized money and powers attracts 
the select few.  The competitive practices that such environments encourage favor 
men over women.  
 The absence of women in top management, the financial sector, and 
elsewhere thus serves as a symptom of something more than just the failure of 
individual women to ascend to the higher paying positions in American society.  It 
is also a symptom of the creation of a much more deeply unequal society in ways 
that go beyond gender.  The same practices that produced gender disparities at 
Microsoft, after all, also contributed to the scandals at Enron.323  And numerous 
studies find that large salaries and the concentration of power breeds overconfidence 
– and egotism, hubris, and arrogance.324 
 These factors then touch off a series of consequences with reinforcing 
effects.  The top corporations focus more on earnings reports than investment in new 
plants, research, or employees.  The companies often slash training program or move 
operations overseas even when that produces a loss of otherwise needed expertise – 
and the decimation of well-paying mid-range jobs in the United States.325  Retail 
companies like Wal-Mart experience pressure to pay their employees little unless 
forced by a tighter labor market to pay more than rock bottom salaries.  The same 
forces contribute to greater corporate and economic instability as the search for the 
next unicorn encourages often unjustified risk-taking, and as the incentives to play 
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accounting games decrease the reliability and transparency of American business 
practices.326   
It is not a solution simply to add women to the upper echelons of 
corporations without changing the backdrop template of evaluation. Ellen Pao’s 
claim, after all, is that her self-interested behavior should have been tolerated 
alongside the men’s.  And Carly Fiorina became CEO at Hewlett-Packard in large 
part because she had been previously CEO of a smaller company (Lucent 
Technologies) whose stock had soared because of “creative accounting and liberal 
financing of sales to customers.”327  Instead, the failure to include women in upper 
management should be seen as a sign of management toleration of the types of 
environments that contribute to greater inequality, instability, and efforts to rig the 
game.328   
 The ultimate reform of the system will require, however, not just the 
inclusion of women but greater efforts to include pro-social and institution- (rather 
than self-) promoting qualities.329  These qualities include attention to employee 
morale, the creation of collaborative work environments that make employee 
contributions more than the sum of their parts,330 longer term horizons, and 
reciprocal notions of loyalty that tie employers and employees closer together. 
Antidiscrimination efforts, which once assumed a more level playing field 
for white men, were designed to ensure women and minority access to the “good” 
jobs in the economy.  Today, antidiscrimination efforts that target competitive 
evaluation systems that discriminate could play a dual role.  They could help to 
ensure fairer systems for everyone.   They could also become a vehicle for 
identifying the counterproductive practices that have made the corporate tournament 
a zero sum enterprise.  
The doctrinal proposal we make here is intended to reverse the foreground 
and background of workplace decisions.  For too long, antidiscrimination lawsuits 
have focused on individual instances of unequal treatment that have taken place 
against a backdrop of negative sum workplace competitions where merit is measured 
by short term successes in intensely competitive environments. One example of this 
is the stacked ranking system just beginning to be challenged in the Moussouris 
litigation for its gendered effects.  Our project is broader – we hope to encourage 
courts to embrace a commitment to equality that will inform the interpretation of 
antidiscrimination law in ways that can withstand the coming era of a conservative 
Supreme Court. 
Antidiscrimination law has historically had two components:    a moral one 
– discrimination is wrong – and a structural one, that sought to promote equality for 
                                                 
326 See Black & Carbone, supra note 128, at 380, 402. 
327 KHURANA, supra note 128, at 109. 
328 See SCANDALOUS ECONOMICS, supra note 18; June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Unequal 
Terms:  Gender, Power, and the Recreation of Hierarchy, 69 STUD. IN LAW, POLITICS, & 
SOC’Y 189 (2016).   
329 See Eagly, Women as Leaders, supra note 246 (indicating that transformational leadership 
styles associated with women also work better for men). 
330 Stout, supra note 11, at 559-60; Eagly, Women as Leaders, supra note 246. 
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workers collectively through  efforts to keep in place the factors supporting good 
jobs.   The legal and economic infrastructure of good jobs at mid-century is 
gone.  For antidiscrimination law to serve its original purposes means once again 
creating a way for equality efforts and antidiscrimination law to operate in 
tandem.  This article offers a beginning to that effort. 
    
  
   
 
 
 
 
